Translated and edited by Walter Lippmann for CubaNews. Finally, after two months without any official mention, the announcement was made confirming the holding of the VIII Congress of the Communist Party of Cuba (PCC) on April 16-19, coinciding with the 60th anniversary of the proclamation of the socialist character of the revolution and the victory of Playa Giron (Bay of Pigs). Quite a few Party militants and foreign observers on the subject harbored doubts as to whether or not such a congress should be held in the current conditions of economic, social and political crisis Cuba is going through. Not a few insisted that the most important thing now is to overcome as far as possible the major crisis and leave the formalities of the congress for a major. But, something symptomatic indicated that the congress would certainly be held: the prominent and sustained manner during several days in the Cuban official media about the holding of the Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam (PCV), highlighting in these reports the reelection of the first secretary, the election of a new Politburo with many new figures and the impulse to the redesign of its economic model of changes and reforms known as Doi Moi. Such informative coverage fit perfectly as an introduction to the holding of the VIII Congress of the Cuban Communists. And the other “letter of introduction” to the congress, was the announcements of revision and critical rectification of the first steps (especially in matters of extreme shortages, prices, salaries, monetary unification plus corruption, monetary unification, plus corruption and “kickbacks” that have unleashed a tremendous wave of unrest and discontent) linked to the implementation of the so-called “Ordinance”. These were accompanied by the much delayed green light for the promotion of micro and small enterprises, abandoning the old limit of 127 occupations for a horizon of no less than 2000 occupations, the most important announcement in the matter of very late and always postponed reforms. With these “letters of introduction” a certain guessing game becomes necessary, that which they call possible scenarios and hypotheses, which we will be able to see in the unfolding of this next congress. The most positive scenario would be: —Definitive retirement of the last leaders of the so-called “historic generation,” well into their 80’s and approaching their 90’s, headed by Raul Castro and Jose Ramon Machado Ventura. This withdrawal could have a compensatory formula similar to the one carried out by the Vietnamese a few years ago when they withdrew their “historical leaders” but keeping them in a sort of advisory council, more symbolic than effective. —Expansion of economic reforms involving the redefinition of areas such as property, limiting the State to “the fundamental means of production” (as the great majority of the best economists in the country have been demanding for many years) and substantially increasing foreign investment [“inversión extranjera” or “EI”] in a direct and mixed manner at a much more accelerated and flexible pace. —The land must return to its original principle: to the one who works it, converting the current tenants into owners and “freeing” the agricultural cooperatives from the constant interference and suffocation by state regulations in their work and commercialization (end of Acopio). Full independence for them. —A possible, and more functional, reduction of the institutional and bureaucratic apparatus, be it the Political Bureau, the Secretariat, the Council of State, the Executive Committee, the National Assembly (one of the most numerous in the world and which barely functions six days a year). The National Assembly should function as a permanent body. —The changes and reforms adopted so far are presented as starting points for a more effective deepening of the redesign of the model. —Such changes should lead to a significant reduction of unrest and discontent if they imply a significant improvement in the current levels of crisis of the model, which is perceived as the turning point towards effective recovery horizons. Such a scenario would also have a positive impact on the international interlocutors most closely related to Cuba, laying the foundations for a better image and greater attractiveness. The less positive scenario —Extend the terms of the “historic generation,” introducing only minor changes in the composition of the leadership at the highest levels. —Maintain restrictive foreign investment schemes. —Maintaining the heavy burden of party and state apparatuses. —The adoption of very limited “patches” to the Ordinance. —The changes made so far are presented as the culmination of the reforms. —If this less positive scenario prevails, it will be yet another congress without any transcendence, except that of prolonging and worsening the present levels of crisis mentioned above. In the international arena, the image it would project would be particularly negative and very unattractive to more constructive levels of association. As for possible changes in figures, the following can be pointed out: —Effective retirement of the most important leaders of the “historic generation,” headed by Raúl Castro and Machado Ventura in their 80s and not a few approaching their 90s. —For the leadership of the Party, Miguel Díaz-Canel -current president (59)- should take over as First Secretary and most likely as Second Secretary Lázaro Expósito Canto (65), the most recognized and efficient provincial secretary of the Party (Santiago de Cuba). —To replace Díaz-Canel in the presidency, the most suitable candidate -with more political-diplomatic stature and experience- would be Bruno Rodríguez Parrilla (62), current Foreign Minister, with General Luis Alberto Rodríguez López-Calleja (59), executive director of the holding company known as GAESA, as probable vice-president due to his experience in the economic field and with broad international experience. In his absence, the engineer Inés María Chapman Waugh, favorably noted for her economic management in the field of water resources. Then comes the question: Who would assume the position of Foreign Minister? The two most likely candidates: Vice Minister Rogelio Sierra, especially for his experience in the field of relations with respect to Latin America and the Caribbean or José Ramón Cabañas could also be considered, given his extensive experience in relations with the U.S. and Canada. —Another variant to the above would be to appoint the current Vice-President and Minister of Economy and Planning, Alejandro Gil Fernandez (54), as second to Rodriguez Parrilla, considering his proven experience in promoting the current changes, with Luis Alberto Rodriguez Lopez-Callejas assuming his position. —It is no less important to take a no less speculative look at the current commanders of the FAR. The “historical” division generals in their 80s and some approaching their 90s, such as Ramiro Valdés Menéndez (88), vice-president Samuel Rodiles (89), President of the Institute of Physical Planning, Ramón Espinosa Martín, Vice-Minister of the FAR; Joaquín Quintas Solá (83), Leop[oldo Cintra Frías (80), the current minister of the FAR. They could be relieved by the so-called “generation of Africans” due to their military missions in Africa and who today are in their 60s and some of them are already entering their 70s. They could be division and brigade generals such as Onelio Aguilera (62), chief of the Western Army; Rafael Hernández (71, who is black), chief of the Eastern Army; Raúl Rodríguez Lobaina (71, also black), chief of the Central Army and the recently appointed Minister of the Interior, Lázaro A. Alvarez CaSAS (57), former vice-minister of the MININT. For Minister of the FAR, the most likely candidate is Raul Castro’s favorite and current Vice Minister of the FAR, Alvaro Lopez Miera (77). But ultimately, the most essential thing will not be the movement of leaders and commanders, but the policy designs towards a positive change or to continue clinging to the provenly inoperative model that still prevails.
Finalmente, luego de dos meses sin referencia oficial alguna, se conoció el anuncio ratificando la celebración del VIII Congreso del Partido Comunista de Cuba en los dias 16-19 de Abril, coincidiendo con el 60 aniversario de la proclamación del carácter socialista de la revolución y la victoria de Playa Girón (Bahía de Cochinos). No pocos militantes del Partido y observadores extranjeros del tema, albergaban dudas sobre la conveniencia o no de celebrarse semejante congreso en las condiciones actuales de crisis económica, social y política por las que atraviesa Cuba. No pocos insistían en que lo primordial ahora es superar dentro de lo posible la mayor dicha crisis y dejar las formalidades del congreso para un major. Pero, algo sintomático indicó que con toda seguridad se celebraría el congreso: la manera destacada y sostenida durante varios dias en los medios ofciales de información cubanos acerca de la celebración del Congreso del Partido Comunista de Viet Nam (PCV), destacándose en esas informaciones la reelección del primer secretario, la elección de un nuevo Politburo con muchas figuras nuevas y el impulso al rediseño de su modelo económico de cambios y reformas conocido como Doi Moi. Semejante cobertura informativa encajaba perfectamente como introducción a la celebración del VIII Congreso de los comunistas cubanos. Y la otra “carta de introducción” al congreso, eran los anuncios de revisión y rectificación crítica de los primeros pasos (sobre todo en materia de carencias extremas, precios, salarios, unificación monetaria más corrupción y “mordidas” que han desatado una tremenda ola de malestar y descontento) vinculados con la puesta en práctica del llamado Ordenamiento y acompañado por la muy demorada luz verde para el fomento de las micro y pequeñas empresas, abandonando el viejo límite de las 127 ocupaciones por un horizonte de no menos de 2000 ocupaciones, el más importante anuncio en materia de reformas bien tardías y siempre aplazadas. Con estas “cartas de introducción” se hace necesario un cierto juego de adivinanzas, eso que llaman posibles escenarios e hipótesis, que podremos ver en el desenvolvimiento de este próximo congreso. El escenario más positivo sería: —Retiro definitivo de los últimos dirigentes de la llamada “generación histórica,” bien entrados en los 80 y acercándose a los 90, encabezada por Raúl Castro y José Ramón Machado Ventura. Este retiro pudiera tener una fórmula compensatoria similar a la realizada por los vientamitas años atrás cuando retiraron a sus “históricos” pero conservándolos en una suerte de consejo consultivo, más simbólico que efectivo. —Ampliación de las reformas económicas que supongan la redefinición de las áreas de propiedad, limitándose el Estado a “los medios fundamentales de producción” (como han venido reclamando la gran mayoría de los mejores economistas del país desde hace muchos años) e incrementar sustancialmente la IE de manera directa y mixta a un ritmo mucho más acelerado y flexible. —La tierra debe volver a su principio original: al que la trabaja, convirtiéndose los arrendatarios actuales en propietarios y “liberar” las cooperativas agrícolas de la constante injerencia y asfixia de parte de las regulaciones estatales en su quehacer y comercialización (fin de Acopio). Plena independencia para las mismas. —Una posible, y más funcional, reducción del aparataje institucional y burocrático sea el Buró Político, el Secretariado, el Consejo de Estado, el Comité Ejecutivo, la Asamblea Nacional (una de las más numerosas del mundo y que apenas funciona seis dias al año). La Asamblea Nacional debe funcionar como órgano permanente. —Los cambios y reformas adoptados hasta ahora se presentan como puntos de partida para una profundización más efectiva del rediseño del modelo. —Semejantes cambios deberán producir una sensible disminución del malestar y descontento si los mismos suponen una sensible mejoría en los actuales niveles de crisis del modelo, que sea percibido como el punto de viraje hacia horizontes de recuperación efectiva. Semejante escenario supondría además un impacto positivo en los interlocutores internacionales más relacionados con el tema de Cuba, sentando las bases de una mejor imagen y mayores atractivos. El scenario menos positive —Prolongar los mandatos de la “generación histórica,” introduciendo sólo cambios menores en la composición de la dirigencia a los más altos niveles. —Mantener los esquemas restrictivos a la IE. —Mantener la pesada carga del aparataje partidista y estatal. —La adopción de muy limitados “parches” al Ordenamiento. —Se presentan los cambios efectuados hasta ahora como culminación de las y final de las reformas. —De prevalecer este escenario menos positivo, será otro congreso más sin trascendencia alguna, salvo la de prolongar y agudizar los presentes niveles de crisis antes apuntados. En el orden internacional, la imagen que proyectaría sería particularmente negativa y muy poco atractiva a niveles de asociación más constructivos. En cuanto a posibles cambios de figuras, se pueden señalar los siguientes: —Retiro efectivo de los más importantes dirigentes de la “generación histórica,” encabezados por Raúl Castro y Machado Ventura en sus 80 y no pocos acercándose a los 90. —Para la dirección del Partido, deberá asumir como Primer Secretario Miguel Díaz-Canel -actual presidente (59)- y como Segundo Secretario más probable Lázaro Expósito Canto (65), el más reconocido y eficiente secretario provincial del Partido (Santiago de Cuba). —Para reemplazar a Díaz-Canel en la presidencia el candidato más idóneo -con más estatura política-diplomática y experiencia- sería Bruno Rodríguez Parrilla (62), actual Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores, teniendo como vice-presidente probable por su experiencia en el campo económico y con amplia experiencia internacional al General Luis Alberto Rodríguez López-Calleja (59), director ejecutivo del holding conocido como GAESA, o en su defecto a la ingeniera Inés María Chapman Waugh, destacada favorablemente por su gestión económica en el campo de los recursos hidraúlicos. Viene entonces la pregunta: ¿Quién asumiría la posición de canciller? Los dos candidatos más probables: el Vice Ministro Rogelio Sierra, sobre todo por su experiencia en el campo de las relaciones con respecto a América Latina y el Caribe o también pudiera considerarse a José Ramón Cabañas, dada su extensa experiencia en las relaciones con EEUU y Canadá. —Otra variante a la anterior sería la de nombrar al actual Vice-Presidente y Ministro de Economía y Planificación, Alejandro Gil Fernández (54), como segundo de Rodríguez Parrilla, considerando su probada experiencia en el impulso a los cambios actuales, asumiendo su cargo Luis Alberto Rodríguez López-Callejas. —No menos importante es echar un vistazo no menos especulativo a los mandos actuales de las FAR. Los generales de division “históricos” en sus 80 y algunos acercándose a los 90 como Ramiro Valdés Menéndez (88), vice-presidente Samuel Rodiles (89), Presidente del Instituto de Planificación Física, Ramón Espinosa Martín, Vice-Ministro de las FAR; Joaquín Quintas Solá (83), Leop[oldo Cintra Frías (80), ministro actual de las FAR. Podrán ser relevados por la llamada “generación de los africanos” por sus misiones militares en Africa y que hoy están en sus 60 y tanto y algunos ya entrando en los 70. Ellos podrán ser los generales de division y brigada como Onelio Aguilera (62), jefe del Ejército Occidental; Rafael Hernández (71, negro), Jefe del Ejército Oriental; Raúl Rodríguez Lobaina (71, negro), Jefe de Ejército Central y el recién designado Ministro del Interior, Lázaro A. Alvarez CaSAS (57), ex viceministro del MININT. Para Ministro de las FAR lo más seguro es que sea el favorito de Raúl Castro y actual Vice Inistro Priumero de las FAR, Alvaro López Miera (77). Pero en última instancia lo más esencial no será el movimiento de drigientes y mandos, sino los diseños de política hacia un viraje positivo o continuar aferrados al modelo probadamente inoperante que todavía prevalece.
The VIII Congress of the PCC: Possible Scenarios
by Domingo Amuchastegui
February 12, 2021
Received from the author by email.VIII CONGRESO DEL PCC: POSIBLES ESCENARIOS
Por Domingo Amuchastegui
12de febrero 2021
Recibido del autor por correo electrónico.
By Domingo Amuchastegui.
Translated and edited by Walter Lippmann for CubaNews.
Received by email January 27, 2020.
Written during the Trump administration.
Cuba today faces its most critical and complex situation. This is the result of the interaction of three factors. The most recent is the multifaceted impact of the arrival of the coronavirus or COVID-19, which ranges from damage to the health-care system and the population in general to the impact on its economy. Added to this is the economic war of the Trump administration against Cuba, and with a no less harmful gravitation, the persistence of a proven inoperative model that refuses to deepen and broaden the path of reforms.
In such a context, it is essential to examine the challenges and priorities that in the short and immediate term -and with a level of urgency as never before- the Cuban leadership will have to deal with and find the best and most lasting solutions to ensure its recovery and stabilization.
At the level of the INTERNAL SECTOR:
The need to minimize and reduce to a minimum the complexities and costs of the effects of the pandemic in the shortest possible time.
Undertake the redesign of the economic model with the necessary comprehensiveness and depth. This has been lacking in the reform measures adopted so far, which appear as isolated and incomplete patches that fail to energize the entire economy at the levels it requires. Let no one be scandalized by what I am saying. Let us recall Fidel Castro’s words to journalist Jeffrey Goldberg for the important US publication The Atlantic (9/8/2010): “The Cuban Model Doesn’t Even Work for Us Anymore”.
Such a redesign in which the state concentrates on what Cuban economists repeat over and over again: the fundamental means of production (key sectors) of the island (sugar industry, not its agricultural part; nickel/cobalt, biopharmaceuticals, tourism industry, exportable medical services, energy, citrus, fishing, rum and tobacco), which must be consistently opened to its association with foreign capital (an aspect that President Diaz-Canel and the Minister of Economy, Alejandro Gil, have been insisting on repeatedly, but still without translating them into actions and projects consistent with such an imperative).
At the same time, to get rid of the heavy and unproductive burden that has been represented for decades by the costly and unproductive ownership and administration of tens of thousands of small businesses that should be transferred to the cooperative and private sectors, in a broad and sustained project for the promotion of SMEs [Small and Medium Enterprises].
Recovery and effective dynamization of the key sectors mentioned above in terms of productivity and export capacity. SMEs -private, cooperatives and tenants or farmers- must be exempted from the tax burdens and bureaucratic interference that today slow down and asphyxiate their normal operation and development. This includes their more functional and flexible articulation to the export/import and financing processes and space in the national banking system. Open these sectors to investments by Cuban emigrants.
Specific issues of utmost importance are the need to: a) Significantly increase productivity levels and reduce production costs, especially in the tourism and biopharmaceutical industries; b) Eliminate the mechanisms of compulsory contracting by foreign companies through state agencies and the tax overload that this mechanism entails; c) Guarantee the sale of all goods and services to the Cuban economy, especially in the tourism and biopharmaceutical industries; d) Ensure the sale of all goods and services to foreign companies through state agencies and the tax overload that this mechanism entails; e) Ensure that all goods and services are sold in the Cuban market. To guarantee the sale of all supplies and equipment rental to SMEs (otherwise theft, corruption, and the so-called underground economy will continue to reign); d. To reduce by no less than 50% the tax on purchases in convertible currency stores (MLC).
Last but not least: To advance definitively, and in a comprehensive manner, in the process of monetary and exchange unification in order to stabilize in a real way the income of the population and the exchange and transfer of foreign companies operating in Cuba.
At the EXTERNAL SECTOR level:
To promptly and effectively face and settle foreign debt obligations as well as commercial credits owed.
In line with the official emphasis on the need to promote foreign investment (FI) as a strategic component, review and update the 2014 Investment Law in order to make it more attractive and encourage the arrival of foreign capital, including foreign direct investment (FDI) and other modalities that more effectively meet the requirements of foreign investment. Avoid at all costs, negotiating disasters such as those conducted with GLAXO and the Siemens/Total energy project, among others. Rationalize the Portfolio of Opportunities offered every year to foreign entrepreneurs attending the Havana International Fair (FIHAV), making it more selective and with greater incentives.
With the utmost urgency, design a strategy -and as an effective practice- to boost the growth of investments in the Special Development Zone of Mariel (ZEDM) and its Container Terminal, since so far its revenues barely cover its operating and maintenance costs. This project -the most important in the Cuban economy so far in the new century- may perish due to starvation or lack of relevant projects. Attracting important projects with the capacity to re-export to the entire region is no less indispensable.
It is time for the Cuban leadership to reflect on its pariah status with respect to the international financial system, its institutions and mechanisms, and to consider exploring and advancing in this direction, which could well begin through levels of association and cooperation with the World Bank. If successful in this approach to the World Bank, and considering that the OAS sanctions were lifted several years ago, Havana could manage -without a formal return to that organization- an approach that could be sponsored by CELAC members and that would result in some level of association and cooperation with the IDB. Such steps would undoubtedly serve to give confidence and encourage the flow of EI and credits to the Cuban economy.
Por Domingo Amuchastegui
Jan 27, 2021 8:57 AM
Cuba enfrenta hoy su más crítica y compleja situación. Ello es resultado de la interacción de tres factores. El más reciente lo constituye el impacto multifacético de la llegada del coronavirus o COVID-19, que va desde los perjuicios al sistema de salud y a la población en general hasta el impacto a su economía (Ver Coronovirus y Cuba). A esto se suma la guerra económica de la administración Trump contra Cuba, y con una gravitación no menos perjuidical, la persistencia de un modelo probadamente inoperante que se resiste a profundizar y ampliar el camino de las reformas.
En semejante contexto, resulta imprescindible un examen de los desafíos y prioridades que a corto e inmediato plazo -y con un nivel de urgencia como nunca antes- la dirigencia cubana tendrá que lidiar con ello y encontrar las mejores, y más duraderas, soluciones que aseguren su recuperación y estabilización.
A nivel de SECTOR INTERNO:
Aminorar y reducir al mínimo las complejidades y costos de los efectos de la pandemia en el más breve posible plazo.
Acometer el rediseño del modelo económico con la integralidad y profundidad necesaria, y de lo cual han carecido las medidas de reformas hasta ahora adoptadas, que aparecen como parches aislados e incompletes que no logran dinamizar la totalidad de la economíaa los niveles que la misma require. Nadie se escandalice por lo que planteo. Recordemos las palabras de Fidel Castro al periodista Jefrrey Goldberg para la importante publicación estadounidense The Atlantic (9/8/2010): “The Cuban Model Doesn’t Even Work for Us Anymore.”
Un rediseño tal en los cuales el Estado se concentre en lo que los economistas cubanos repiten una y otra vez: los medios fundamentales de producción (sectores claves) de la isla (industria azucarera, no su parte agrícola; níquel/cobalto, biofarmacéuitica, industria turística, servicios médicos exportables, energía, cítricos, pesca, ron y tabaco), que deben abrirse consistemente a su asociación con el capital extranjero (aspecto éste en el que viene insistiendo repeidamente el presidente Díaz-Canel y el Ministro de Economía, Alejandro Gil, pero todavía sin traducirse en acciones y proyectos consistentes con semejante imperativo).
Paralelamente, desembarazarse de la pesada e improductiva carga que ha venido representando durante décadas la propiedad y administración costosísima e improductiva de decenas de miles de pequeños negocios que deben ser transferidos a los sectores cooperativo y privado, en un Amplio y sostenido proyecto de fomento de las PYMES.
Recuperación y efectiva dinamización de los sectores claves antes apuntados en términos de productividad y capacidad exportadora. Las PYMES -privadas, cooperativas y arrendatarios o finqueros- deben ser eximidas de las cargas fiscales e injerencias burocráticas que frenan y asifixian hoy su normal funcionamiento y desarrollo, incluyendo su articulación más funcional y flexible a los procesos de exportación/importación y de financiamiento y un espacio en el sistema bancario nacional. Abrir estos sectores a las inversiones de la emigración cubana.
Cuestiones puntuales de suma importancia son: a) Aumentar sensiblemente los niveles de productividad y reducir costos de producción, en especial en la industria turística y en la biofarmacéutica; b) Suprimir los mecanismos de contratación obligatoria por compañías extranjeras por intermedio de agencias estatales y la sobrecarga impositiva que este mecanismo acompaña; c. Garantizar la venta de todos los suministros y alquier de equipos varios, a las PYMES (de lo contrario seguirán reinando el robo, la corrupción y la llamada economía sumergida); d. Reducir en no menos de un 50% el gravamen sobre las compras en los comercios en moneda convertible (MLC).
Por ultimo y no por ello de menor importancia: Avanzar definitivamente, y de manera integral, en el proceso de unificación monetaria y cambiaria a fin de estabilizar de manera real los ingresos de la población y de cambios y transferencias de las empresas extranjeras que operan en Cuba.
A nivel de SECTOR EXTERNO:
Afrontar y solventar con prontitud y eficacia las obligaciones de la deuda externa asi como de los créditos comerciales adeudados.
En consonancia con el énfasis oficial en la necesidad de promocionar como componente estratégico la inversion extranjera (IE), revisar y actualizar la Ley de Inversiones del 2014 en función de hacer más atractivo e incentivar la llegada del capital del capital extranjero, incluída de manera destacada la inversion extranjera directa (FDI) y otras modalidades que se ajusten más aficazmente a los requerimientos de la IE. Evitar a toda costa, desastres negociadores como las conducidos con GLAXO y el proyecto energético Siemens/Total, entre otros. Racionalizar la Cartera de Oportunidades que cada año se oferta a emporesarios extranjeros asistentes a la Feria Internacional de La Habana (FIHAV), haciéndola más selectiva y con mayores incentivos.
Con máxima urgencia, diseñar una estrategia -y una práctica efectiva- para dinamizar el crecimiento de las inversiones en la Zona especial de Desarrollo de Mariel (ZEDM) y su Terminal de Contenedores pues hasta ahora sus ingresos apenas cubren sus costos de operaciones y mantenimiento. Este proyecto -el más importante en la economía cubana en lo que va del nuevo siglo- puede perecer por inanición o ausencia de proyectos relevantes. Atraer proyectos de peso y con capacidad reexportadora hacia toda la region, es algo no menos indispensable.
Es hora ya de que la dirigencia cubana reflexione acerca de su status de paria con respecto al sistema financiero internacional, sus institucones y mecanismos, y considere explorar y avanzar en esta dirección que bien pudiera comenzar por medio de niveles de asociación y cooperación con el Banco Mundial. Caso de tener éxito en esta aporoximación al Banco Mundial, y onsiderando que las sanciones de la OEA ya fueron levantadas hace ya varios años, La Habana pudiera gestionar -sin un regreso formal a dicha organziación- gestion que pudiera ser auspiciada por miembros de la CELAC y que se tradujera en algún nivel de asociación y cooperación con el BID. Semejantes pasos, indudablemente, servirían para dar confianza e incentivar los flujos de IE y créditos parfa la economía cubana.
By Domingo Amuchastegui Translated and edited by Walter Lippmann for CubaNews. Not a few specialists on the Cuban issue – some with morbid jubilation and others with serious concern – evaluate, from the outside, the current situation on the island in increasingly alarming terms, to the point of using the famous formula of a “perfect storm” to describe what is coming. Without a doubt, the situation may reach profiles of extreme gravity, but – understandably – not in the dimension of public health and healthcare to the population. Here the country’s health system – even in extreme emergency conditions – is still proving to be very effective. Some data (April 15) from official sources indicate that 2,466 people have been hospitalized, of which 814 have been confirmed, 151 have recovered and 24 have died. Compared to the rest of Latin America, Cuba presents a much smaller picture. This is not the case when we examine the economic dimension. But, beware of blaming the virus or the economic warfare unleashed by the Trump administration. It is not by chance that Cuban economist Ricardo Torres (Progreso Semanal, 4/8/2020) makes clear: “The Cuban economy was already showing a gloomy picture before the beginning of the current epidemic. This panorama was clearly noticed when the average annual economic growth was falling unstoppably, with 2.7% in 2010-2015 and by 2016-2019 it was maintaining the same trend, with a growth of only 1.4% (data provided by Torres). This macroeconomic dimension of Torres is complemented by key data provided by another well-known Cuban economist, Juan Triana Cordoví, in an analysis (OnCuba News 4/8/2020): “In the 1985-1986 biennium the total harvested area was 1,328,600 hectares, production reached 68.5 million tons of products and yields were 51.6% tons per hectare”. And he adds the comparison with the results between 2015 and 2016 (Note: the embargo persisted, but Trump had not started its economic war); “The harvested area was 421,600 hectares (Note: Almost one million less), production was 18.1 million tons (Note: 50 million tons less) and yields per hectare were 43 tons per hectare, or 8 tons less. If official policy to date calls for a drastic reduction in food imports, the determining factor is its failed policy for decades in the area of domestic food production. And may I add: this element – food production – is essential for good health. By way of conclusion, Triana connects these numbers with the issue of the virus and emphasizes: “The pandemic emphasizes something that almost everyone has known for many, many years: the strategy of having a food production system that is as solid as possible, something that we have never achieved.” Torres’ conclusion in this area is very similar and precise, in the following terms: “It is time to recognize that the current production and distribution scheme is a complete failure, and needs to be revised from its foundations. In that review, the private and cooperative sector must be empowered. The potential and results of Cuba’s health system are there. They are widely recognized internationally, including by the World Health Organization (WHO) and the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO). Not least, the successes of the industry and research in the bio-pharmaceutical sector are there. It is not by chance that at this critical time, some twenty countries, including most of the CARICOM countries, Italy (Lombardy and Turin regions), Andorra, Qatar, South Africa, Angola, Venezuela and others have contracted the medical services available on the Island. However, such a successful component is not combined or complemented by the economic picture previously presented by two well-known Cuban economists. Nevertheless, the health services factor (doctors in the first place) and bio-pharmaceutical products have been significantly affected and reduced by the expulsion of the doctors from Brazil by Bolsonaro – contrary to the favorable opinions of all the municipalities where they were providing their services, the political turnaround of Ecuadorian President Lenin Moreno and the coup d’état in Bolivia. Figures are not yet available to measure the extent to which the medical services currently contracted and the markets for bio-pharmaceuticals can compensate, and to what extent, for the hemispheric setbacks noted above. In such a context, it should be concluded that Cuba is entering a phase of acute recession and that its GDP could be reduced by any amount, which is very difficult to calculate at this point. Torres summarizes it as follows: “A substantial negative impact is inevitable: open, under strong sanctions, dependent on tourism and no access to any external compensation mechanism in the form of contingent loans from international financial organizations. Other dimensions that aggravate this situation are: 1- The total paralysis of the tourist industry in the short term and the many uncertainties regarding its eventual recovery in the short-and medium- term, as well as a significant reduction in the flow of remittances from Cuban immigrants, due to two factors: a. A reduction in the income of these immigrants and b. The interruption of travel and the total interruption of monetary flows in this way. 2- The pressures arising from Cuba’s financial obligations with respect to its foreign debt and short-term commercial debts. The G-20 has agreed on a moratorium on the debt of 70 poor countries (40 of them African) until December, with French President Emmanuel Macron insisting on the hypothesis of forgiving significant portions of this debt. However, Cuba does not fall into this group of beneficiaries and will have to negotiate a similar treatment on a bilateral basis with the Paris Club, with its European (Spain in the first place) and Asian (China in the first place) creditors. Under these conditions, and their uncertain prolongation, it is impossible to imagine that the Cuban authorities can expect an improvement in their already very low levels of EI. 3- In parallel with the pandemic, the crisis in the oil markets has affected and will affect in the near future the payment capacity of two large Cuban debtors for cooperation projects, Venezuela and Angola. Likewise, it is not to be expected in the immediate future investments from both in any sphere of the Cuban economy, including the important sphere of oil. 4- The multi-million dollar projects agreed upon with Russia at the end of last year will be postponed indefinitely, with a very recent negative precedent. Rosneft, Russia’s major oil company, gave in to extra-territorial pressures and threats from the Trump administration and announced the end of its operations in Venezuela. If so, serious doubts could be raised about its current and future operations in the energy sphere with Cuba. A very similar panorama is presented in the relations and agreements between Havana and Beijing, but with a very significant difference: China is Cuba’s main trading partner and has been pending for years the execution of multiple agreed projects and the granting or not of new soft loans and forgiveness of portions of Cuba’s high debt with China. 5- Projects and measures to reform or redesign Cuba’s inoperative economic system will once again be “frozen”, pending improvements in circumstances. Once again, the Cuban leadership’s ability to survive and recover is being put to the test – this time in the face of unusual dimensions of extreme gravity. Whether or not the willingness to change and the circumstances to come will have the last word.
Por Domingo Amuchastegui No pocos especialistas del tema cubano -unos con júbilo morboso y otros con seria preocupación- valoran desde el exterior la actual situación en la Isla en términos cada vez más alarmantes, al punto de utilizar la famosa fórmula de una “tormenta perfecta” para describir lo que se avecina. Sin lugar a dudas, la situación puede alcanzar perfiles de extrema gravedad, pero -entiéndase bien- no en la dimension de la salud pública y asistencia sanitaria a la población. En esto el sistema de salud del país -incluso en condiciones de emergencia extrema- da todavía sobradas muestras de su eficacia. Algunos datos (abril 15) de fuentes oficiales consignan 2 466 hospitalizados, de estos 814 confirmados, 151 recuperados y 24 fallecidos. En comparación con el resto de los países de América Latina, Cuba presenta un cuadro realmente menor. No ocurre lo mismo cuando examinamos la dimension económica. Pero, mucho cuidado con culpar al virus o a la guerra económica desatada por la administración Trump. No por casualidad aclara el economista cubano Ricardo Torres (Progreso Semanal, 4/8/2020): “La economía cubana ya exhibía un panorama sombrío antes del comienzo de la actual epidemia.” Este panorama se advertía claramente cuando el crecimiento económico promedio annual descendía de forma imparable, con un 2,7% en el 2010-2015 y para el 2016-2019 mantenía la misma tendencia, con un crecimiento de apenas el 1.4% (datos que aporta Torres). Esta dimensión macroeconómica de Torres, se complementa con datos claves que nos ofrece otro bien conocido economista cubano, Juan Triana Cordoví, en un análisis (OnCuba News 4/8/2020).: “En el bienio 1985-1986 la superficie cosechada total fue de 1 328 600 hectáreas, la producción alcanzó los 68,5 millones de toneladas de productos y los rendimientos fueron de 51,6% toneladas por hectárea.” Y agrega la comparación con los resultados entre el 2015 y 2016 (Nota: persistía el embargo, pero Trump no había comenzado su guerra económica); “La superficie cosechada fue de 421 600 hectáreas (Nota: Obsérvese: Casi un millón menos), la producción fue de 18,1 millones de toneladas (Nota: 50 millones de toneladas menos) y los rendimientos por hectáarea fueron de 43 toneladas por hectárea, o sea, 8 toneladas menos. Si la política oficial hasta hoy clama por una drástica reducción de las importación de alimentos, el factor determinante es su fracasada política durante décadas en la esfera de la producción doméstica de alimentos. Y me permito añadir: este elemento -la producción de alimentos- es esencial para una buena salud. A manera de conclusion, Triana conecta estos números con el tema del virus y subraya: “La pandemia enfatiza algo que desde hace muchísimos años casi todos sabemos: lo estratégico de tener un sistema de producción de alimentos lo más sólido possible, algo que no hemos logrado jamás.” La conclusión de Torres en este terreno es muy similar y precisa, en los términos siguientes: “Ya es hora de que se reconozca que el esquema de producción y distribución actual es un fracaso rotundo,y requiere ser revisado desde sus fundamentos. En esa revision, el sector privado y cooperativo debe ser empoderado.” Las potencialidades y resultados del sistema de salud de Cuba están ahí. Tienen amplio reconocimiento internacional, incluyendo la Organización Mundial de la Salud (OMS) y la Organización Panamericana de la Salud (OPS). En no menor medida se suman los éxitos de la industria e investigaciones del sector biofarmacéutico. No por casualidad en estos momentos críticos, una veintena de países, incluyendo la mayoría de los países integrantes del CARICOM, Italia (regiones de Lombardía y Turín), Andorra, Qatar, Africa del Sur, Angola, Venezuela y otros han contratado los servicios médicos de que dispone la Isla. Pero, semejante componente exitoso no se conjuga ni es complementado por el cuadro económico antes presentado por dos economistas cubanos bien conocidos. No obstante, el factor servicios de salud (médicos en primer lugar) y productos biofarmacéuticos se ha visto sensiblemente afectado y reducido por la expulsion de los médicos de Brasil por Bolsonaro -contrariando el criterio favorable de todas las municipalidades donde los mismos prestaban sus servicios, el viraje politico de presidente ecuatoriano Lenin Moreno y la asonada golpista de Bolivia. No se disponen aún de cifras que permitan medir en qué medida los servicios médicos contratados en la actualidad y los mercados para los biofarmacéuticos puedan compensar, y en qué medida, los reveses hemisféricos antes apuntados. En semejante contexto, concluir que Cuba entra en una fase de aguda recesión y que su PIB podrá reducirse en cualquier magnitud, bien difícil de calcular a esta altura. Torres lo sintetiza de la manera siguiente: “Un impacto negativo sustancial es inevitable: abierta, bajo Fuertes sanciones, dependiente del turismo y nulo acceso a algún mecanismo de compensación externa en la forma de préstamos contingents de organismos financieros internacionales.” Otras dimensiones que agravan esta situación son: 1- La paralización total de la industria turística a corto plazo y las muchas incertidumbres sobre su eventual recuperación a corto y mediano plazo asi como una sensible reducción del flujo de las remesas de los cubanos emigrados atendiendo a dos condicionantes: a. Reducción de los ingresos de estos emigrados y b. La interrupción de los viajes y la interrupción total de los flujos monetarios por esta vía. 2- Las presiones derivadas de las obligaciones financieras de Cuba con respecto a su deuda externa y adeudos comerciales a corto plazo. El G-20 ha acordado una moratoria sobre la deuda de 70 países pobres (40 de ellos africanos) hasta diciembre, insistiendo el presidente francés, Emmanuel Macron, en la hipótesis de perdonar porciones signficativas de dicha deuda. Pero, Cuba no entra en dicho grupo de beneficiados y tendrá que negociar un tratamiento similar sobre bases bilaterales con el Club de París, con sus acreedores europeos (España en primer lugar) y asiáticos (China en primer lugar). En estas condiciones, y su prolongación incierta, es imposible imaginarse que las autoridades cubanas puedan esperar una mejoría en sus ya reducídisimos niveles de IE. 3- Paralelo a la pandenmia, la crisis en los mercados petroleros han afectado y afectarán en el futuro próximo la capacidad de pago de dos grandes deudores de Cuba por concepto de proyectos de cooperación, Venezuela y Angola. Igualmente, no es de esperar en lo inmediato inversiones de parte de ambos en ninguna esfera de la economía cubana, incluyendo la importante esfera del petróleo. 4- Los proyectos multimillonarios acordados con Rusia a finales del pasado año se verán aplazados por tiempo indefinido, con un precedente negativo de muy reciente fecha. Rosneft, la gran empresa petrolera de Rusia, cedió ante las presiones y amenazas extraterritoriales de la administración Trump y anunció el fin de sus operaciones en Venezuela, en cuyo caso cabe plantearse serias dudas sobre sus operaciones, actuales y futuras, en la esfera energética con Cuba. Un panorama muy similar se presenta en las relaciones y acuerdos de La Habana con Beijing, pero con una diferencia muy significativa: China es el principal socio comercial de Cuba y tiene pendiente desde hace años la ejecución de múltiples proyectos acordados y el otorgamiento o no de nuevos préstamos blandos y perdón de porciones de la elevada deuda de Cuba con China. 5- Los proyectos y medidas de reforma o rediseño del inoperante Sistema económico de Cuba quedarán, una vez más, “congelados,” a la espera de mejoras circunstancias. De nuevo se pone a prueba -esta vez frente a dimensiones inusuales de extrema gravedad- la capacidad de sobrevivencia y recuperación de parte de la dirigencia cubana. La disposición o no al cambio y las circunstancias venideras dirán la última palabra.
Other Dimensions in the Time of the Corona Virus
April 2020OTRAS DIMENSIONES EN TIEMPOS DEL CORONAVIRUS
Avril 2020
By Domingo Amuchastegui, April 2020
Translated and edited by Walter Lippmann for CubaNews.
Cuba faces its most critical and complex situation today. This is the result of the interaction of three factors. The most recent is the multifaceted impact of the arrival of the coronavirus or COVID-19. Its impact ranges from damage to the health system and the general population to the impact on its economy (see Coronovirus and Cuba). Added to this is the Trump administration’s economic warfare against Cuba, and with no less perjured gravitation, the persistence of a proven ineffective model that resists deepening and widening the path of reform.
In such a context, it is essential to examine the challenges and priorities that in the short and immediate term – and with a level of urgency as never before – the Cuban leadership will have to deal with and find the best, and most lasting, solutions that will ensure its recovery and stabilization.
At the level of INTERNAL SECTOR:
Por Domingo Amuchastegui
Avril 2020
Cuba enfrenta hoy su más crítica y compleja situación. Ello es resultado de la interacción de tres factores. El más reciente lo constituye el impacto multifacético de la llegada del coronavirus o COVID-19, que va desde los perjuicios al sistema de salud y a la población en general hasta el impacto a su economía (Ver Coronovirus y Cuba). A esto se suma la guerra económica de la administración Trump contra Cuba, y con una gravitación no menos perjuidical, la persistencia de un modelo probadamente inoperante que se resiste a profundizar y ampliar el camino de las reformas.
En semejante contexto, resulta imprescindible un examen de los desafíos y prioridades que a corto e inmediato plazo -y con un nivel de urgencia como nunca antes- la dirigencia cubana tendrá que lidiar con ello y encontrar las mejores, y más duraderas, soluciones que aseguren su recuperación y estabilización.
A nivel de SECTOR INTERNO:
A nivel de SECTOR EXTERNO:
February 28, 2020
Translated and edited by Walter Lippmann for CubaNews.
New water charges for hydrometric control in the productive or service sector will begin to be applied as of April 1, officials from the Higher Organization of Business Management (OSDE) Water and Sanitation, of the National Institute of Hydraulic Resources, reported in Havana.
According to the Cuban News Agency, the new prices should contribute to saving the vital liquid in hotels, industries and other centers of production and services, many of which have become large consumers, said Marcia Almeida Llanes, director of State Commissioning of the aforementioned OSDE.
She clarified that, in addition to the companies in this group, there are also self-employed workers and cooperatives, especially when some of their activities or businesses require the important natural resource for commercial purposes.
Likewise, she explained that the water supply service will maintain up to the established standard of a cost of 1.55 pesos per cubic meter (m3) for hotels and other tourism entities.
Industries or other productive sectors and commercial facilities of service and offices will have as rates an amount of 4.20 pesos/m3 until its established standard and an increase to 15 pesos/m3 if they exceed 25 percent of the same. However, there are also discount bonuses of up to 35 percent for entities that save below 25 percent of the established standard, said Almeida Llanes.
“National demand is low and has been covered over the years. But exports in the form of raw materials offer us many possibilities,” said Félix Ramón Fernández, director of the pre-industrial division of the Tabacuba business group.
by Ronald Suárez Rivas | ronald@granma.cu
January 30, 2020 20:01:27
Translated and edited by Walter Lippmann for CubaNews.
PINAR DEL RÍO: With the purpose of increasing exports, and attending a demand that today is not in conditions to cover, Cuba increases the plantating of burley tobacco.
During the current season, the plan is to reach some 1,700 hectares, distributed between the municipalities of Consolación del Sur and Pinar del Río, but the program to develop this crop aims to grow much more.
Félix Ramón Fernández, director of the pre-industry department of the Tabacuba business group, explains that there is currently confirmed demand from foreign customers for 5 000 tons. However, the country’s production will only be able to reach around 2,000 this year.
This is why increasing burley cultivation is one of the sector’s priorities.
Although currently only pineapple fertile lands are harvested, the official says that it will also be taken to other territories in the center of the country, in order to raise production to 10 000 tonnes.
However, the main focus will be on Vueltabajo, where it has already begun to replace dark tobacco in some of the Consolación del Sur and Pinar del Río plantations.
Fernández points out that burley production was very depressed, and was aimed solely at the Cuban industry.
“National demand is low and has been covered all these years. But export in the form of raw materials offers us many possibilities.
Justo Luis Fuentes, president of Tabacuba, assures that “this type of tobacco is very coveted in the world today. Therefore, the increase of its production constitutes a fundamental line of work, for the increase of exports.
“Cuban dark tobacco is also in great demand, but we have a greater quantity of that,” he adds.
Introduced into the country in 1947, in the area of Herradura (municipality of Consolación del Sur), burley is a type of blond tobacco that is mainly used in cigarette blends, due to its ability to retain aromas.
By Lissett Izquierdo, Cubadebate journalist. Graduated from the University of Havana (2014). She worked at the Cuban News Agency from 2011 until September 2018.
and Ferrer Ariel Ley Royero
Translated and edited by Walter Lippmann for CubaNews.
Alejandro Gil, Minister of Economy and Planning, at the eighth Congress of the National Association of Economists and Accountants of Cuba. Photo: Ariel Ley Royero/ ACN.
The Cuban economy plan for 2020 will have a new conception: it will be elaborated without specific directives or limits, since it will come out of the active participation of workers in each company, informed Alejandro Gil, Minister of Economy and Planning (MEP), this Wednesday.
Speaking at the inaugural session of the VIII Congress of the National Association of Economists and Accountants of Cuba (ANEC), at the Havana Convention Center, the Minister argued that planning will become a collective construction, in which the potentialities of the country’s entities are identified.
Gil reminded the delegates and guests that up to the moment a global model of the economy was made, from which the specific directives for sectors came out, that is to say, the requests for goods and services, as well as the pre-defined level of imports and exports that the economy would have.
According to Gil, now “there is no straitjacket,” but we will have to be objective, realistic and conscious. This new way, demanded for years by the workers, also requires a change of mentality, because “there will be those who are used to the numbers coming from above,” said the minister.
For this reason, he said, this process – which is currently taking place in the labor collectives – will require the support of ANEC and the Central de Trabajadores de Cuba (CTC). “The plan that is built has to be by nature more efficient than the one that came from the top down.
Gil ratified that for next year, in the midst of the restrictions that the country presents and the tightening of the blockade imposed by the United States, growth and development can be guaranteed due to the existence of human capital, a national industry with potentialities to be better exploited and a more diversified foreign trade.
Among the priorities, he mentioned activities related to food production, housing programs, transportation, computerization and medicines. The financing of national industry will also take precedence.
In the words of the head of the MEP, one of the problems that hinders the performance of the Cuban economy is the persistence of a mentality that is highly dependent on imports. In recent years there has been a trend towards increasing purchases abroad, which has an impact today, he argued.
He explained that goods are imported that with efforts can be produced within the country. For example, animal feed for pigs, because when there are failures in their purchase, the production and commercialization potholes appear, as happened in the last quarter of last year.
“The economy must prepare itself to gradually reduce these purchases, although it will not be resolved immediately,” he said.
In agreement with Gil, one of the ways to strengthen national industry is to promote productive chains, based on policies and financial incentives. It has also been conceived to strengthen local development projects, based on the use of the endogenous resources of the territories.
Another topic discussed by the Minister of Economy was that of investments. He commented that not infrequently there are differences between feasibility studies and yields. In these studies, scientific rigor must prevail, he said.
He added that the return on investment is little analyzed, when the most important thing is the examination of the expected result of the investment and how it impacted the economy.
Economists committed to the development of their country
Eighth Congress of the National Association of Economists and Accountants of Cuba, at the Havana Convention Center. Photo: Ariel Ley Royero/ ACN.
In the opening remarks, Oscar Luis Hung Pentón, president of ANEC, reiterated the commitment of the more than 80,200 members of the organization to the process of updating the Cuban economic model.
In reviewing ANEC’s performance in recent years, Hung Pentón highlighted the activity of improvement, especially of officials and specialists in the state sector of the economy, as well as the development of science.
On the other hand, the working links between ANEC and the Permanent Commission for the Implementation and Development of the Guidelines constitute an expression of the close communication existing today between the governmental structures, directly involved in the transformations of the economy, and the prevailing Cuban economic thought in the civil society, said the expert.
The meeting was attended by Jorge Cuevas Ramos, member of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the Party and Head of its Economic Department; Meisi Bolaños, head of Finance and Prices; and Abel Prieto, director of the Martiano Program Office and president of the José Martí Cultural Society.
By Arthur González
June 9, 2018
Translated and edited by Walter Lippmann for CubaNews
Never before has the U.S. government allowed Internet access to Cuba, nor the use of under-sea cables that pass near its coasts or other facilities. Many Internet sites are banned from the island because of the 59-year economic war. However, Barack Obama approved a license for Google to enter Cuba. What were the reasons for that decision?
To help Cubans access more scientific, technical and other information to improve the Cuban economy?
Definitely not. Definitely not. Access restrictions still remain in many of these areas, the real objective was to reach Cuban youth with their distorted information, symbols, and values, as Obama himself stated:
“…we can do more to support the Cuban people and promote our values through commitment. “The changes introduced in our new policy will further enhance our goal of empowering the Cuban people. […] and provide them with new sources of information…”
Of course, Cuba must take advantage of this opening, however small it may be. [We want] to go out into the world and make our truth known, to defeat the media campaigns that overflow the network of networks with lies, such as false claims of violations of the rights of Cubans, to share Cuba’s achievements, achieved with effort and sacrifice, despite the damage caused by the criminal policies of the United States.
It is the opportunity to tell the world about the terrorist acts carried out by the U.S. government, the biological warfare which affected the people and the persecution of all the foreign banks and companies that try to establish business with Cuba.
In order not to be naïve, Cubans must be aware of what lies behind Obama’s [granting of the] license and why Donald Trump maintains it, despite having taken steps to dismantle many aspects of his predecessor’s policy, including the Presidential Directive, which sought to kill the people with honey, rather than with whips.
During his presidential campaign, Donald Trump took on the reactionary and ultraconservative language embodied in the Republican Party Platform, which sets out, among other things, the following points:
“The opening of the current Obama administration to Cuba was a shameful accommodation to the demands of the tyrants. They will only strengthen that military dictatorship. […] We demand an aerial platform for Radio and TV Martí broadcasts, and the promotion of Internet access as a technological tool to strengthen the pro-democracy movement in Cuba.”
Since his arrival in the White House, Trump has delivered on his campaign for the presidency, but he has not changed the license granted to Google for Cuba. In recent days he allowed Google’s executive president, Eric Emerson Schmidt, to travel to Havana in the company of Republican Senator Jeff Flake. Their background speaks for itself.
In 1996, the RAND Corporation of the United States National Defense Research Institute conducted a study for the Defense Department entitled “Cuban Communications, Computer Networks and their Implications for U.S. Policy.
That work puts forth the need to help open up Cuba and to force the emergence of an independent civil society, for which it states:
“It is necessary to encourage Cuba’s link to the Internet, to use it to transmit balanced news and analysis, to promote its use by Cuban NGOs, universities and other audiences.
Insisting on that, in March 2005, ultra-conservative Roger Noriega, Under Secretary of State for Western Hemispheric Affairs, testified at a congressional hearing:
“The United States has relaxed licensing requirements so that, for the first time, high-speed personal computers can be delivered to civil society groups.
During an event held in 2012 at the Heritage Foundation, in conjunction with Google Ideas, a report was prepared recommending that the U.S. government create a remote WIFI network to enable Cubans to access the Internet.
In that gathering Republican Senator Marco Rubio was present. He said:
“The Cuban totalitarian system could collapse if all Cubans had free access to the Internet, because Cuba would follow the same fate as those countries that spent the Arab Spring.
The State Department announced on June 13, 2013, proposed projects to promote democracy and human rights in Cuba, including the use of digital tools to be used, selectively and safely, by the civilian population, along with other programs to promote equality and defend the social networks of black Cubans.
Programs created for subversion in Cuba such as Zunzuneo and Conmotion, the latter designed by the Open Technology Institute at The New America Foundation, were promptly denounced.
We welcome full access to the Internet, because Cubans are sufficiently prepared to know how to differentiate between the useful and the subversive, but in the face of an enemy that has not stopped attacking for more than half a century, we must always be alert and, as José Martí said:
“Do at every moment what is necessary at every moment”
By Juventud Rebelde digital@juventudrebelde.cu
Published: Thursday 12 April 2018 | 02:08:31 AM
A CubaNews translation. Edited by Walter Lippmann.
At press time, it was announced that a customer had signed a contract with a commercial unit of the Cuban Telecommunications Company (Etecsa) in Guanabacoa, in the eastern part of Havana, with whom the country has five million active mobile line services. According to information provided by Etecsa’s Institutional Communication Department, this figure confirms the growing evolution of mobile telephony on the island in recent years. Keep in mind that in December 2003 there were only 43,000 active mobile lines, by April 2008 the number of these had risen to 223 000, by March 2014 it had reached 2 million, by December 2016 it had reached 4 million, and 2017 closed with 4.22 million of these services.
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