By Domingo Amuchastegui
May 5, 2022
Received by email from the author
Translated and edited by Walter Lippmann for CubaNews.
After May Day in Cuba, it is convenient to point out some very important issues.
Following the social outburst of July 11, 2021 originated by the sustained intolerance and gross negligence in the management of the Party-State, the effects of the economic war applied by the Trump administration (maintained until today by the Biden administration) and the devastating consequences of two years of pandemic, the image of stability and legitimacy of the experience of the Cuban Revolution suffered its most important setback after several episodes of negative signs that pointed in that direction (Mariel, Maleconazo and Balseros in the first place). There was an abundance of critical judgments and attacks on the police violence deployed, the trials of those arrested and the sentences handed down.
The worst prognoses abounded and more than a few doubted the capacity of the Party-State to reestablish its stability and legitimacy. Many questioned its ability to rally broad masses of the population behind it and whether it would be able to masses of the population and whether it would be able to do so on May Day, the effects of the pandemic attenuated.
The mass turnout that the Cuban leadership was able to mobilize on this May Day both in the capital of the country and in all the provincial capitals. There were not thousands or tens of thousands, but hundreds of thousands throughout the country. Carried? Obliged? Only unconditional supporters of the “regime?
Such formulations fall more than short. This mass demonstration, of the broadest popular sectors, overthrer the worst prognoses, neutralized the worst forecasts, neutralizee to a considerable extent the negative effects of 11J [July 11], to a large extent restored the image of stability and legitimacy. Of course, none of this in any way diminishes the tensions and grievances existing today in Cuban society. Instead of congratulating the Cuban leaders for the success of the mobilization, what happened on May Day should summon them with more urgency and comprehensiveness to the reforms and solutions that the whole country has been demanding.
To attend or not? The Summit of the Americas to be held in early June in the U.S. presents a serious problem created by the Biden administration. As organizers of the event, Washington is determined to exclude three countries: Cuba, Venezuela and Nicaragua. Biden seeks a disciplined and obedient conference, without voices that raise problems and positions discordant with his administration’s objectives on many issues. There is no desire to hear arguments against the embargo (blockade) or the hemispheric and international legitimacy of these countries and other hot-button issues such as migration, trade and investment and the hypothesis of a single currency for South America and the Caribbean.
The worst-case scenario in terms of confrontation would be the case of Cuba, excluded for many years, but whose admission has been was recognized by the Obama administration (of which Biden himself was the vice-president and not even questioned by the Trump administration. So why are Biden and his team taking this position? Perhaps with the delusional idea of winning the Cuban and Latino vote in Florida, and thus securing his impossible re-election?
Recently, Mexico’s President Lopez Obrador has emphasized a cardinal reasoning with respect to this possible exclusion: “If they are not (countries) of the Americas, what galaxy are they from?” The trajectories of brutal repression and political assassinations in not a few countries of the hemisphere in recent years would seem to be no reason to exclude them. Then there is the wave of electoral victories of forces described as “leftist” and of stability and legitimacy, although none of this in any way diminishes the tensions and grievances existing today in Cuban society. Instead of congratulating the Cuban leaders for the success of the mobilization, what happened on May Day should summon them with more urgency and urgency and comprehensiveness to the reforms and solutions that the whole country has been demanding.
To attend or not? The Summit of the Americas to be held in early June in the U.S. presents a serious problem created by the Biden administration. As organizers, Washington is determined to exclude three countries: Cuba, Venezuela and Nicaragua. Biden seeks a disciplined and obedient conference, without voices that raise problems and positions out of sync with his administration’s objectives on many issues. There is no desire to hear arguments against the embargo (blockade) or the hemispheric and international legitimacy of these countries and other hot-button issues such as migration, trade and investment and the hypothesis of a single currency for South America and the Caribbean.
The worst-case scenario in terms of confrontation would be the case of Cuba, excluded for many years, but whose admission was recognized by the Obama administration (of which Biden himself was the vice-president) and not even questioned by the Trump administration. So why are Biden and his team taking this position? Perhaps with the delusional idea of winning the Cuban and Latino vote in Florida, and thus securing his impossible re-election?
Recently, Mexico’s President Lopez Obrador emphasized a cardinal reasoning with respect to this possible exclusion: “If they are not (countries) of the Americas, what galaxy are they from?” The trajectories of brutal repression and political assassinations in not a few countries of the hemisphere in recent years would seem to be no reason to exclude them, nor would the wave of electoral victories of forces of a left described as “leftist” and forces described as “pink” by many media and specialists, as well by specialists of a similar inclination, strengthen the growing of opposition to Biden’s policies and actions from the Mexican border to border from Mexico to Santiago de Chile and Buenos Aires.
With strength, the CELAC (Conference of Latin American and Caribbean States) and the Puebla Group (comprised of a major group of Latin American and Caribbean (made up of an important group of parties and personalities) have clearly pronounced themselves against against such exclusionary maneuvers. The three “bad guys” (Cuba, Venezuela and Nicaragua), for their part, have strongly denounced this US maneuver.
So what will the Biden administration do to ensure that this conference will represent the Americas as a whole, without exclusion or discrimination? We will soon see the consequences of such an action, which is totally inappropriate.
His political and intellectual stature, his modesty and honesty in all aspects, made him worthy of the admiration and respect of all his comrades and of his people, since the times of the people, from the times of the clandestine struggle against Batista’s tyranny, to the internal struggles to the internal struggles within the M-26-7 and the University of Havana, his enlightening speeches in the panels of the People’s University, in his long years in the his long years at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MINREX), both as brilliant director as well as brilliant ambassador to the UN, vice-minister and minister. His presentations, his brilliant participation in negotiations and conflicts, were always brilliant until his his promotion to the Political Bureau and to the presidency of the National Assembly with the same trajectory.
The official media in Cuba (press, radio and TV) and even beyond (El País of Spain, Eurovision and others) highlighted his work. Spain, Eurovision and others) also highlighted the news of his death and of his political and diplomatic and of his political and diplomatic performance.
Undoubtedly, an extraordinary man. And if he was – as everyone acknowledges – one must ask why he was why he was inexplicably and abruptly removed from all his positions. No explanation was given to his people; to anyone. He disappeared from the public public scene and never again held a position in the Party or Government. Nothing. What cardinal sins did he incur to mistreat him in this way, almost at the end of his life? No one can explain it; no one can justify it. It remained as one more mystery at the highest levels of power. It is not the only case of of such unjustifiable behavior.
Let us hope that when Leopoldo Cintra Frías (former minister of the FAR and the officer with the most internationalist actions accomplished) or Abelardo Colomé Ibarra (Minister of the Interior) pass away. Ibarra (Minister of the Interior), both members of the Politburo, both Heroes of the Republic and both disappeared from the political scene without an explanation. In what monumental errors did they incur to become Non-Persons? Corruption, nepotism, disloyalty, political differences? Those who admired and respected them for decades deserve a valid explanation.
Por Domingo Amuchastegui
(5/5/2022)
Pasado el Primero de Mayo en Cuba, conviene puntualizar algunas cuestiones de mucha importancia.
A raiz del estallido social del 11 de Julio del 2021 originado por la sostenida intolerancia y mayúsculas negligencias en la gestión del Partido-Estado, los efectos de la guerra económica aplicada por la administración Trump (mantenida hasta hoy por la administración Biden) y las consecuencias devastadoras de dos años de pandemia, la imagen de estabilidad y legitimidad de la experiencia de la Revolución Cubana sufrió su más importante revés después de varios episodios de signo negativo que apuntaban en esa dirección (Mariel, Maleconazo y Balseros en primer lugar). Abundaron los juicios críticos y ataques a la violencia policíaca desplegada, los juicios a los arrestados y a las condenas aplicadas.
Los peores pronósticos abundaban y no pocos dudaban de la capacidad del Partido-Estado para restablecer su estabilidad y legitimidad. Muchos se cuestionaban la capacidad del mismo para convocar en su apoyo a amplias masas de la población y si sería capaz de hacer esto el Primero de Mayo, atenuados los efectos de la pandemia.
El baño de masas del que fue capaz de articular la dirigencia cubana este Primero de Mayo tanto en la capital del país como en todas las cabeceras provinciales. No fueron miles o decenas de miles, sino cientos de miles a lo largo y ancho delpaís. ¿Acarreados? ¿Obligados? ¿Sólo incondicionales del “régimen?
Semejantes formulaciones se quedan más que cortas. La demostración de masas, de amplísimos sectores populares, echan por tierra los peores pronósticos, neutralizan en medida considerable los efectos negativos del 11J, en buena medida restablecen la imagen de estabilidad y legitimidad, aunque nada de esto en nada disminuye las tensiones y reclamos existentes hoy en la sociedad cubana. En lugar de congratularse los dirigentes cubano por el exitazo movilizativo, lo sucedido el Primero de Mayo debe convocarlos con mayor urgencia e integralidad a las reformas y soluciones que la totalidad del país viene reclamando.
¿Asistir o no? La Cumbre de las Américas a celebrarse a comienzos de junio en EEUU presenta un serio problema creado por la administración Biden. Como organizadores de la misma, Washington se empeña en excluir de la misma a tres países: Cuba, Venezuela y Nicaragua. Biden busca una conferencia disciplinada y obediente, sin voces que planteen problemas y posiciones discordantes con los objetivos de su administración con respecto a no pocos temas cruciales. No se desea escuchar argumentos contra el embargo (bloqueo) o la legitimidad hemisférica e internacional de estos países y otros temas candentes como las migraciones, comercio e inversiones y la hipótesis de una moneda única para Suramérica y el Caribe.
El peor de los casos en materia de confrontación sería el caso de Cuba, excluída durante largos años, pero reconocida su admisión por la administración Obama (de la cual era vicepresidente el mismísimo Biden) y no cuestionada ni siquiera por la administración Trump. Entonces, ¿por qué Biden y su equipo asumen esta posición? ¿Tal vez con la ilusa idea de ganar el voto cubano y latino de la Florida y con ello asegurarse su imposible reelección?
Recientemente, el presidente de México, López Obrador, ha enfatizado un razonamiento cardinal con respecto a esta posible exclusión: “Si no son (países) de las Américas, ¿de qué galaxia son?” Las trayectorias de brutales represiones y asesinatos políticos en no pocos países del hemisferio en estos últimos años parecen no ser razón para excluirlos; la oleada de victorias electorales de fuerzas de una izquierda calificada de “rosada” por muchos medios y especialistas asi como las venideras victorias de similar inclinación, fortalecen el creciente bloque contestario a las políticas y acciones de Biden desde la frontera de México hasta Santiago de Chile y Buenos Aires.
Con fuerza, la CELAC (Conferencia de Estados de América Latina y el Caribe) y el Grupo de Puebla (compuesto por un importante grupo de partidos y personalidades) se han pronunciado claramente contra tales maniobras de exclusión. Los tres “malos de la película” (Cuba, Venezuela y Nicaragua) por su parte han denunciado con fuerza esta maniobra de EEUU.
¿Qué hará entonces la administración Biden para que esta conferencia represente a la totalidad de las Américas, sin exclusiones ni discriminaciones? Veremos muy pronto y las consecuencias de semejante acción, del todo improcedente.
Fallece Ricardo Alarcón de Quesada
Su estatura política e intelectual, su modestia y honradez en todos los órdenes, lo hizo acreedor de la admiración y respeto de todos sus compañeros y de su pueblo, desde los tiempos de la lucha clandestina contra la tiranía de Batista hasta las luchas intestinas dentro del M-26-7 y en la Universidad de La Habana, sus esclarecedoras intervenciones en los paneles de la Universidad Popular, en su largos años en el Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores (MINREX), tanto como director como brilante embajador en la ONU, vice-ministro y ministro. Sus presentaciones, su brillante participación en negociaciones y conflictos, fueron siempre brillantes hasta su promoción al Buró Político y a la presidencia de la Asamblea Nacional con idéntica trayectoria.
Los medios oficiales en Cuba (prensa, radio y TV) e incluso más allá (El País de España, Eurovisión y otros) destacaron igualmente la noticia de su fallecimiento y de su ejecutoria política y diplomática.
Sin dudas, un hombre extrardinario. Y si así fue -como todos reconocen- hay que preguntarse porqué fue, inexplicable y bruscamente, destituído de todos sus cargos. No se le dio una explicación a su pueblo; a nadie. Desapareció de la escena pública y jamás volvió a ocupar un cargo en el Partido o Gobierno. Nada más injusto. ¿En qué pecados capitales incurrió para maltratarlo de esa manera, casi al final de su vida? Nadie se lo explica; nadie lo justifica. Quedó como un misterio más en las máximas instancias del poder. No es el único caso de semejante proceder injustificable.
Esperemos que cuando fallezcan Leopoldo Cintra Frías (ex-ministro de las FAR y el oficial con más acciones internacionalistas cumplidas) o Abelardo Colomé Ibarra (Ministro del Interior), ambos miembros del Buró Político, los dos Héroes de la República y ambos desaparecidos de la escena política sin una explicación, se aclaren el por qué de semejantes acciones. ¿En qué monumentales errores incurrieron para convertirse en No-Personas? ¿Corrupción, nepotismo, deslealtad, discrepancias? Los que los admiraron y respetaron durante décadas merecen una explicación válida.
May 19, 2021 Translated and edited by Walter Lippmann for CubaNews. The recently concluded VIII Congress of the Communist Party of Cuba (PCC) reiterated and ratified once again the characterization of the Party as “Party of the Cuban Nation,” a formulation that has been a fundamental idea since the IV Congress (1991). And I wonder: Is it valid? Does it correspond to our socio-cultural and national reality and the tendencies that shape our development today? I think not. I think it is a statement that does not fit at all to what it tries to claim. I also believe that it is necessary for the current leadership to seriously reconsider such a formula for the sake of its own credibility, prestige and a bit of necessary modesty. Do not take this as an unfounded and insolent questioning; neither as an attempt of ideological subversion, enemy propaganda or other usual suspicions and attempts at disqualification. I try to approach this as seriously and rigorously as possible, and I invite everyone to reflect on this important issue. Here are some arguments and criteria that may serve this necessary discussion: In the first decade of the Party’s existence (1965-1975), Cuban society reached high levels of economic-social homogenization after the absolutist nationalizations, thus culminating a long stage of struggles and significant transformations in terms of social benefits. This, together with Fidel’s talent and charisma, the permanent confrontation with the US and an exile [movement] at the service of the latter, shaped a political and ideological context of majority support for the revolution. The Party could rightly claim and aspire to being the vanguard of the people or, at least, of the majority sectors of the people. However, there was a tendency to ignore and underestimate the effects of economic and social attrition -and its effects on the political positioning of many people- that years of deprivation and material shortages caused. The Camarioca episodes and the so-called “freedom flights”, until their cancellation, were not only initial symptoms of a hostile tendency, of discontent, of alienation and that found in the escapist option of emigrating to the U.S., its best solution. By the end of the 1960s, the Minister of the Interior at the time (Commander Sergio del Valle), warned in a conference behind closed doors that an essentially new phenomenon was beginning to emerge: the class composition of “those who were leaving” was beginning to change; they were no longer “bourgeoisie siquitrillidos” [bourgeois whose goods had been taken] but working people, the humble, from the city and even from rural areas. This approach, unfortunately, did not translate into timely policy designs to counteract such a trend. This precedes and explains to a great extent -together with the demystifying influence of the “flights of the community”- the conflict at the Peruvian embassy and Mariel (1980), whose analysis, dominated by confrontation and humiliations (“the scum,” the rapid response brigades and the acts of repudiation), did not lead to a rectification in the direction suggested early on by Comandante Sergio del Valle. Meanwhile, generational changes in the population went completely unnoticed. The generation that had fought against Batista was visibly aging and around it a structure of interests and material goods was being created that would also benefit children and grandchildren. Meanwhile, the increase in the population of young people was growing in an environment where the past of struggle was already becoming a vague reference to “the old” or to the heroism of past times, while the present was a daily struggle to “resolve” recurrent shortages, a phenomenon that would become extremely acute with the collapse of the so-called “real socialism” in Eastern Europe and the USSR. This collapse – beyond the aggravation of the critical material situation of the country – had another effect that is not spoken about: The young generations educated in the superiority of the world socialist system saw with astonishment the crumbling of the whole architecture of supposed principles, values and alliances on which they had been educated. This was a factor that promoted disappointments, a feeling of having been deceived, frustration, with the usual balance of disenchantment and which translates into very diverse options, from opting for various beliefs, cults and churches, fraternal societies to a thousand forms of corrupt practices and always the recurrent option of emigrating to the USA (“la pira pa’ la Yuma”). Proof to the song: When Luis Orlando Dominguez, ex-secretary general of the UJC and member of the Central Committee is prosecuted for a case of corruption, his main argument was: “I did what I saw other leaders doing,” and that brings to mind the famous popular phrase in Cuba before ’59: “Immoralities without me not because I fight them; me you have to take me.” The tragic culmination of such a tendency would be represented sometime later by the events of the Ochoa-Abrantes case (1989) and during the following two decades by the cases of Army Corps General Abelardo Colomé Ibarra, Commander Rogelio Acevedo and his wife, the Aldana case and that of Abelardo Colomé Ibarra (Furry) and his children, and other less-known cases involving ministers and senior government officials. The cost of these last episodes severely hit the levels of moral authority, prestige and credibility of the leadership. Not admitting this is pure blindness. Not by chance, the then member of the Political Bureau, Jorge Lezcano, warned with great concern about the possibility of having to “govern in minority,” a way of reasoning that was not only extremely serious, but absolutely unacceptable. In such a context, to proclaim oneself “Party of the Nation” appeared to the eyes of many as an unreal pretension. It is no less unrealistic to persist in this formulation today. It bore a very unfortunate kinship with the well-known phrase of the French King Louis XIV that “The State is me.” The Cuba of these last decades is not that of the struggle against Batista, Girón, the struggle against the counterrevolutionary rebels, the October Crisis, Ché and the internationalist deeds,. Instead, it is one of a very precarious survival derived from a monopolist-absolutist Party/State that clings to a proven inoperative model, inseparable from the world of shortages and an incessant and devastating incessant economic war on the part of the US, aggravated today to the extreme by the effects of the pandemic. Cuba is today a society where the processes of economic and social differentiation have been accentuated in a thousand different ways. Very diverse sectors have extended to private activities (that which we euphemistically insist on calling “non-state sector”), where the private and tenant agricultural sectors -and not the agricultural cooperatives, which see their potentialities nullified. Th same or worse is happening with the CAN (Non Agricultural Cooperatives) – as a direct result of state control and interference. These involve two types of citizens, those who have MLC (freely convertible currency) and those who depend almost exclusively on the peso. Today, we have an active population of almost one million people who no longer depend for their livelihood on a salary from the State, a phenomenon that was unheard of four decades ago. And to each of these sectors correspond specific interests and aspirations, different horizons, ideas and proposals of their own that do not necessarily have to coincide or accept those proposed and provided by the Party and its government. From another angle, we face the migration issue, which is also a challenge of capital proportions. Almost one million Cubans (and more if we add their descendants) have emigrated to the United States and most of them have a manifest hostility towards the Cuban authorities, to the extent of pronouncing themselves mostly in favor of former President Trump. Are they or will they be considered part or not of the Cuban nation? Today, their intertwining with the island’s population reaches heights unsuspected in the distant past. More than 600,000 visited Cuba before the pandemic, an impressive number with a very diverse load of influences, values and connections. Are they visualized as part of the nation or not? Correspondingly, will they be extended full rights or not? Will the set of restrictions and costs that limit their ability to travel normally to their country of origin be ended for those who have retained their original citizenship? Will they be entitled to any organized parliamentary representation? The conferences called “The Nation and Emigration” were not convened for 15 years; an important and unavoidable component of our nation was thus alienated. Are they of no interest, are there no possibilities to come together and work on the differences and possible coincidences? Is “The Nation” no longer interested in this considerable segment of our population, even if they have renounced their citizenship for elementary conveniences? Are we perhaps excluding them as members of our nation? All this differentiated economic and social universe offers a picture as a nation that did not exist four decades ago, but that today does exist and manifests itself in a thousand different ways and with an unprecedented level of interactions, diffusion and influences thanks to cyberspace and the social networks. It is a diversity that must be assumed in all its complexity and ensuring the steps and mechanisms that open the possibility of legitimate expression, sometimes coinciding, sometimes disagreeing and with different proposals and others in open opposition, without anyone being offended or scandalized. This should be reflected at all levels, Party, Government, National Assembly and in the official media, without verticalism or linear behavior, without demanding loyalties based on intolerance, unconditional obedience or the vote by a show of hands. Is it perhaps unfounded or unacceptable that this diversity comes to have representations in the Party and even as different parties? Or is it that we have already forgotten that of “base and superstructure”? Let us be reasonable in dealing with the current diversity and its future increase if an integral redesign of the model is completed and not patches here and there and its consequences for the inevitable economic and political reordering of the whole system. This heterogeneous nation today, and much more tomorrow, demands this rethinking. The Party can be the Party of many and can aspire -through its effective practice- to be the vanguard Party of many, but in no way can it claim to be the Party of the nation. The latter is much, much more, diverse. Under these conditions this Party cannot claim to represent the totality of society and the nation. I repeat: A total rethinking is necessary.
Por Domingo Amuchastegui (19/5/2001) El recién concluído VIII Congreso del Partido Comunista de Cuba (PCC) reiteró y ratificó una vez más la caracterización del Partido como “Partido de la Nación Cubana,” formulación que se inscribe como una idea fundamental desde el IV Congreso (1991). Y me pregunto: ¿Es acaso válida; se corresponde con nuestra realidad socio-cultural y nacional y las tendencias que configuran nuestro desarrollo hoy en dia? Pienso que no; pienso que es un enunciado que no se ajusta en nada a lo que pretende reclamar. Creo además que se impone para la dirigencia actual reconsiderar seriamente semejante fórmula en aras de su propia credibilidad, prestigio y de un poco de necesaria modestia. No se tome esto como un cuestionamiento infundado e insolente; tampoco como un intento de subversion ideológica, propaganda enemiga u otras suspicacias e intentos habituales de descalificación. Trato de abordar esto con la mayor seriedad y rigor posibles, e invito a todos a reflexionar acerca de esta importante cuestión. A continuación algunos argumentos y criterios que pueden servir a esta discusión necesaria:
The Party of the Cuban Nation?
by Domingo Amuchastegui
PARTIDO DE LA NACION CUBANA?
February 18, 2021
A CubaNews translation. Edited by Walter Lippmann.
For some time now I have insisted that we are in the presence of the gestation of what I have called “Navalny’s route a la Cubana.” Understand well “a la cubana.” What do I mean by this? We are in the presence -without the mass component so far seen in Russia or a more effective figure than Navalny- of the maturation of concerted initiatives on both shores -and with financing and sponsorship from the side here- in order to achieve the crystallization of a current or movement capable of negatively impacting the image of the Cuban Revolution, or what is left of it at this point, with its [consequent] costs both internally and externally.
To the well-known components of extreme aggravation of the crisis of the Cuban model (proven inoperative in the economic field, the sixty-year old embargo was turned into an economic war by Trump plus the multiple effects and costs of the pandemic), we must now add other no less important ones.
On an international scale, Navalny’s route is defined as the most influential -and most encouraged- option to erode the Putin option from the US and the EU. In the Cuban case, it is primarily aimed at weakening the international credibility of the Cuban government and at fostering internally superior schemes of agitation and confrontation that will increase to levels never seen before the levels of unrest and discontent in broad sectors of society with a tendency to the hypothesis of socio-political explosions of the kind called “Maleconazo”.
The following factors favor such a scenario:
a. The unprecedented levels of the current crisis;
b. There is no way out or improvement in the short or medium-term;
c. The gravitation of the “Miami” factor has grown as never before;
d. And, an extremely novel and influential factor: the accelerated computerization in recent times with its links through social networks now create levels of information and communication that escape any attempt to control or annul them.
We are not now facing the projects of the Cuban-American Foundation, the Ladies in White, Payá, etc., etc., which were exhausted and defeated in the long road from the ’90s to date. The so-called San Isidro Movement may resemble some of those old attempts, but it is now inscribed in a different perspective. Even more so are the incidents in front of the Ministry of Culture in terms of defiance and larger participation.
Episodes like this were unimaginable in the 90s. Now they are there and, eventually, [will be] called-upon to continue and multiply. A singular fact, by way of a novel milestone, is the Patria y Vida episode, which cannot be underestimated in the least, both for its content and its effects.
It would be a serious mistake to approach these novel contexts with the usual media disqualifications, police operations or violent actions (not to mention the rapid response brigades). The moment is essentially different and demands from the Cuban authorities entirely different economic-social, political, and media responses to neutralize these tendencies and re-establish, as far as possible, greater legitimacy.
And from all of the above -in order to interrupt the “Cuban Navalny route”- the so-called “historical exiles” based in Miami, and those in Washington who seek to prevent or reduce as much as possible the resumption of the process of normalization of bilateral relations, with greater or lesser effectiveness, may or may not benefit. Now the bases that are being configured tend to favor the most negative schemes in this direction.
Por Domingo Amuchastegui
18 de febrero 2021
De un tiempo a esta parte he insistido en que estamos en presencia de la gestación de lo que he llamado “la ruta de Navalny a la cubana,” entiéndase bien “a la cubana.” ¿Qué quiero decir con esto? Estamos en presencia -sin el comnponente de masas hasta ahora que se ha visto en Rusia ni una figura más eficaz que Navalny- de la maduración de iniciativas concertada en ambas orillas -y con financiamiento y auspicio del lado de acá- a fin de lograr la cristalización de una corriente o movimiento capaz de impactar negativamente la imagen de la Revolución cubana o lo que queda de ella a esta altura, con sus costos tanto internos como externos.
A los conocidos componentes de agudización extrema de la crisis del modelo cubano (probadamente inoperante en lo económico, el embargo sexagenario convertido en guerra económica por Trump más los múltiples efectos y costos de la pandemia), hay que añadir ahora otros no menos importantes. A escala internacional la ruta de Navalny se define como la opción más influyente -y más alentada- para erosionar la opción Putin desde EEUU y la UE. En el caso cubano se enfila primordialmente a debilitar la credibilidad internacional del Gobierno cubano y de fomentar a lo interno esquemas superiores de agitación y confrontación que agiganten a niveles nunca antes vistos los niveles de malestar y descontento en amplios sectores de la sociedad con tendencia a la hipótesis de explosiones socio-políticas del corte del llamado “Maleconazo.” Favorecen semejante escenario: a. Los niveles sin precedentes de la crisis actual; b. No avizorarse una salida o mejoría a corto ni mediano plazo; c. La gravitación del factor “Miami” ha crecido como nunca antes; d. Y un factor en extremo novedoso e influyente: la informatización acelerada en estos últimos tiempos con sus enlaces por medio de las redes sociales crean ahora niveles de información y comunicación que escapan a cualquier intento por controlarlas o anularlas.
No estamos ahora frente a los proyectos de la Fundación Cubano-Americano, de las Damas de Blanco, Payá, etc., etc. los que quedaron agotados y derrotados en el largo camino de los 90 hasta la fecha. El llamado Movimiento San Isidro puede parecerse a algunos de esos viejos intentos, pero se inscribe ahora en una perspectiva diferente. Lo son más todavía los incidentes ante el Ministerio de Cultura en términos de desafío y participación más numerosa. Episodios así era inimaginables en los 90. Ahora están ahí y, eventualmente, llamados a continuar y multiplicarse. Un hecho singular, a manera de novedoso hito, es el episodio de Patria y Vida, que no puede subestimarse en lo más mínimo tanto por su contenido como por sus efectos. Craso error será abordar estos novedosos contextos con las descalificaciones mediáticas habituales, operativos policiales o acciones violentas (para no recordar las brigadas de respuesta rápida). El momento es esencialmente diferente y demanda de parte de las autoridades cubanas respuestas económico-sociales, políticas y mediáticas enteramente diferentes que neutralicen estas tendencias y restablezcan en lo posible una mayor legitimidad.
Y de todo lo anterior -a fin de interrumpir “la ruta de Navalny a la cubana”- podrán o no beneficiarse el llamado “exilio histórico” asentado en Miami y aquellos que en Washington buscan impedir o reducir al máximo el que se retome con mayor o menor eficacia el proceso de normalización de las relaciones bilaterales y ahora las bases que se están configurando tienden a favorecer los esquemas más negativos en esta dirección.
¿Qué les parece? Sería útil compartir estas apreciaciones con algunos amigos por allá…
Un abrazo,
Chomin
Translated and edited by Walter Lippmann for CubaNews. Finally, after two months without any official mention, the announcement was made confirming the holding of the VIII Congress of the Communist Party of Cuba (PCC) on April 16-19, coinciding with the 60th anniversary of the proclamation of the socialist character of the revolution and the victory of Playa Giron (Bay of Pigs). Quite a few Party militants and foreign observers on the subject harbored doubts as to whether or not such a congress should be held in the current conditions of economic, social and political crisis Cuba is going through. Not a few insisted that the most important thing now is to overcome as far as possible the major crisis and leave the formalities of the congress for a major. But, something symptomatic indicated that the congress would certainly be held: the prominent and sustained manner during several days in the Cuban official media about the holding of the Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam (PCV), highlighting in these reports the reelection of the first secretary, the election of a new Politburo with many new figures and the impulse to the redesign of its economic model of changes and reforms known as Doi Moi. Such informative coverage fit perfectly as an introduction to the holding of the VIII Congress of the Cuban Communists. And the other “letter of introduction” to the congress, was the announcements of revision and critical rectification of the first steps (especially in matters of extreme shortages, prices, salaries, monetary unification plus corruption, monetary unification, plus corruption and “kickbacks” that have unleashed a tremendous wave of unrest and discontent) linked to the implementation of the so-called “Ordinance”. These were accompanied by the much delayed green light for the promotion of micro and small enterprises, abandoning the old limit of 127 occupations for a horizon of no less than 2000 occupations, the most important announcement in the matter of very late and always postponed reforms. With these “letters of introduction” a certain guessing game becomes necessary, that which they call possible scenarios and hypotheses, which we will be able to see in the unfolding of this next congress. The most positive scenario would be: —Definitive retirement of the last leaders of the so-called “historic generation,” well into their 80’s and approaching their 90’s, headed by Raul Castro and Jose Ramon Machado Ventura. This withdrawal could have a compensatory formula similar to the one carried out by the Vietnamese a few years ago when they withdrew their “historical leaders” but keeping them in a sort of advisory council, more symbolic than effective. —Expansion of economic reforms involving the redefinition of areas such as property, limiting the State to “the fundamental means of production” (as the great majority of the best economists in the country have been demanding for many years) and substantially increasing foreign investment [“inversión extranjera” or “EI”] in a direct and mixed manner at a much more accelerated and flexible pace. —The land must return to its original principle: to the one who works it, converting the current tenants into owners and “freeing” the agricultural cooperatives from the constant interference and suffocation by state regulations in their work and commercialization (end of Acopio). Full independence for them. —A possible, and more functional, reduction of the institutional and bureaucratic apparatus, be it the Political Bureau, the Secretariat, the Council of State, the Executive Committee, the National Assembly (one of the most numerous in the world and which barely functions six days a year). The National Assembly should function as a permanent body. —The changes and reforms adopted so far are presented as starting points for a more effective deepening of the redesign of the model. —Such changes should lead to a significant reduction of unrest and discontent if they imply a significant improvement in the current levels of crisis of the model, which is perceived as the turning point towards effective recovery horizons. Such a scenario would also have a positive impact on the international interlocutors most closely related to Cuba, laying the foundations for a better image and greater attractiveness. The less positive scenario —Extend the terms of the “historic generation,” introducing only minor changes in the composition of the leadership at the highest levels. —Maintain restrictive foreign investment schemes. —Maintaining the heavy burden of party and state apparatuses. —The adoption of very limited “patches” to the Ordinance. —The changes made so far are presented as the culmination of the reforms. —If this less positive scenario prevails, it will be yet another congress without any transcendence, except that of prolonging and worsening the present levels of crisis mentioned above. In the international arena, the image it would project would be particularly negative and very unattractive to more constructive levels of association. As for possible changes in figures, the following can be pointed out: —Effective retirement of the most important leaders of the “historic generation,” headed by Raúl Castro and Machado Ventura in their 80s and not a few approaching their 90s. —For the leadership of the Party, Miguel Díaz-Canel -current president (59)- should take over as First Secretary and most likely as Second Secretary Lázaro Expósito Canto (65), the most recognized and efficient provincial secretary of the Party (Santiago de Cuba). —To replace Díaz-Canel in the presidency, the most suitable candidate -with more political-diplomatic stature and experience- would be Bruno Rodríguez Parrilla (62), current Foreign Minister, with General Luis Alberto Rodríguez López-Calleja (59), executive director of the holding company known as GAESA, as probable vice-president due to his experience in the economic field and with broad international experience. In his absence, the engineer Inés María Chapman Waugh, favorably noted for her economic management in the field of water resources. Then comes the question: Who would assume the position of Foreign Minister? The two most likely candidates: Vice Minister Rogelio Sierra, especially for his experience in the field of relations with respect to Latin America and the Caribbean or José Ramón Cabañas could also be considered, given his extensive experience in relations with the U.S. and Canada. —Another variant to the above would be to appoint the current Vice-President and Minister of Economy and Planning, Alejandro Gil Fernandez (54), as second to Rodriguez Parrilla, considering his proven experience in promoting the current changes, with Luis Alberto Rodriguez Lopez-Callejas assuming his position. —It is no less important to take a no less speculative look at the current commanders of the FAR. The “historical” division generals in their 80s and some approaching their 90s, such as Ramiro Valdés Menéndez (88), vice-president Samuel Rodiles (89), President of the Institute of Physical Planning, Ramón Espinosa Martín, Vice-Minister of the FAR; Joaquín Quintas Solá (83), Leop[oldo Cintra Frías (80), the current minister of the FAR. They could be relieved by the so-called “generation of Africans” due to their military missions in Africa and who today are in their 60s and some of them are already entering their 70s. They could be division and brigade generals such as Onelio Aguilera (62), chief of the Western Army; Rafael Hernández (71, who is black), chief of the Eastern Army; Raúl Rodríguez Lobaina (71, also black), chief of the Central Army and the recently appointed Minister of the Interior, Lázaro A. Alvarez CaSAS (57), former vice-minister of the MININT. For Minister of the FAR, the most likely candidate is Raul Castro’s favorite and current Vice Minister of the FAR, Alvaro Lopez Miera (77). But ultimately, the most essential thing will not be the movement of leaders and commanders, but the policy designs towards a positive change or to continue clinging to the provenly inoperative model that still prevails.
Finalmente, luego de dos meses sin referencia oficial alguna, se conoció el anuncio ratificando la celebración del VIII Congreso del Partido Comunista de Cuba en los dias 16-19 de Abril, coincidiendo con el 60 aniversario de la proclamación del carácter socialista de la revolución y la victoria de Playa Girón (Bahía de Cochinos). No pocos militantes del Partido y observadores extranjeros del tema, albergaban dudas sobre la conveniencia o no de celebrarse semejante congreso en las condiciones actuales de crisis económica, social y política por las que atraviesa Cuba. No pocos insistían en que lo primordial ahora es superar dentro de lo posible la mayor dicha crisis y dejar las formalidades del congreso para un major. Pero, algo sintomático indicó que con toda seguridad se celebraría el congreso: la manera destacada y sostenida durante varios dias en los medios ofciales de información cubanos acerca de la celebración del Congreso del Partido Comunista de Viet Nam (PCV), destacándose en esas informaciones la reelección del primer secretario, la elección de un nuevo Politburo con muchas figuras nuevas y el impulso al rediseño de su modelo económico de cambios y reformas conocido como Doi Moi. Semejante cobertura informativa encajaba perfectamente como introducción a la celebración del VIII Congreso de los comunistas cubanos. Y la otra “carta de introducción” al congreso, eran los anuncios de revisión y rectificación crítica de los primeros pasos (sobre todo en materia de carencias extremas, precios, salarios, unificación monetaria más corrupción y “mordidas” que han desatado una tremenda ola de malestar y descontento) vinculados con la puesta en práctica del llamado Ordenamiento y acompañado por la muy demorada luz verde para el fomento de las micro y pequeñas empresas, abandonando el viejo límite de las 127 ocupaciones por un horizonte de no menos de 2000 ocupaciones, el más importante anuncio en materia de reformas bien tardías y siempre aplazadas. Con estas “cartas de introducción” se hace necesario un cierto juego de adivinanzas, eso que llaman posibles escenarios e hipótesis, que podremos ver en el desenvolvimiento de este próximo congreso. El escenario más positivo sería: —Retiro definitivo de los últimos dirigentes de la llamada “generación histórica,” bien entrados en los 80 y acercándose a los 90, encabezada por Raúl Castro y José Ramón Machado Ventura. Este retiro pudiera tener una fórmula compensatoria similar a la realizada por los vientamitas años atrás cuando retiraron a sus “históricos” pero conservándolos en una suerte de consejo consultivo, más simbólico que efectivo. —Ampliación de las reformas económicas que supongan la redefinición de las áreas de propiedad, limitándose el Estado a “los medios fundamentales de producción” (como han venido reclamando la gran mayoría de los mejores economistas del país desde hace muchos años) e incrementar sustancialmente la IE de manera directa y mixta a un ritmo mucho más acelerado y flexible. —La tierra debe volver a su principio original: al que la trabaja, convirtiéndose los arrendatarios actuales en propietarios y “liberar” las cooperativas agrícolas de la constante injerencia y asfixia de parte de las regulaciones estatales en su quehacer y comercialización (fin de Acopio). Plena independencia para las mismas. —Una posible, y más funcional, reducción del aparataje institucional y burocrático sea el Buró Político, el Secretariado, el Consejo de Estado, el Comité Ejecutivo, la Asamblea Nacional (una de las más numerosas del mundo y que apenas funciona seis dias al año). La Asamblea Nacional debe funcionar como órgano permanente. —Los cambios y reformas adoptados hasta ahora se presentan como puntos de partida para una profundización más efectiva del rediseño del modelo. —Semejantes cambios deberán producir una sensible disminución del malestar y descontento si los mismos suponen una sensible mejoría en los actuales niveles de crisis del modelo, que sea percibido como el punto de viraje hacia horizontes de recuperación efectiva. Semejante escenario supondría además un impacto positivo en los interlocutores internacionales más relacionados con el tema de Cuba, sentando las bases de una mejor imagen y mayores atractivos. El scenario menos positive —Prolongar los mandatos de la “generación histórica,” introduciendo sólo cambios menores en la composición de la dirigencia a los más altos niveles. —Mantener los esquemas restrictivos a la IE. —Mantener la pesada carga del aparataje partidista y estatal. —La adopción de muy limitados “parches” al Ordenamiento. —Se presentan los cambios efectuados hasta ahora como culminación de las y final de las reformas. —De prevalecer este escenario menos positivo, será otro congreso más sin trascendencia alguna, salvo la de prolongar y agudizar los presentes niveles de crisis antes apuntados. En el orden internacional, la imagen que proyectaría sería particularmente negativa y muy poco atractiva a niveles de asociación más constructivos. En cuanto a posibles cambios de figuras, se pueden señalar los siguientes: —Retiro efectivo de los más importantes dirigentes de la “generación histórica,” encabezados por Raúl Castro y Machado Ventura en sus 80 y no pocos acercándose a los 90. —Para la dirección del Partido, deberá asumir como Primer Secretario Miguel Díaz-Canel -actual presidente (59)- y como Segundo Secretario más probable Lázaro Expósito Canto (65), el más reconocido y eficiente secretario provincial del Partido (Santiago de Cuba). —Para reemplazar a Díaz-Canel en la presidencia el candidato más idóneo -con más estatura política-diplomática y experiencia- sería Bruno Rodríguez Parrilla (62), actual Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores, teniendo como vice-presidente probable por su experiencia en el campo económico y con amplia experiencia internacional al General Luis Alberto Rodríguez López-Calleja (59), director ejecutivo del holding conocido como GAESA, o en su defecto a la ingeniera Inés María Chapman Waugh, destacada favorablemente por su gestión económica en el campo de los recursos hidraúlicos. Viene entonces la pregunta: ¿Quién asumiría la posición de canciller? Los dos candidatos más probables: el Vice Ministro Rogelio Sierra, sobre todo por su experiencia en el campo de las relaciones con respecto a América Latina y el Caribe o también pudiera considerarse a José Ramón Cabañas, dada su extensa experiencia en las relaciones con EEUU y Canadá. —Otra variante a la anterior sería la de nombrar al actual Vice-Presidente y Ministro de Economía y Planificación, Alejandro Gil Fernández (54), como segundo de Rodríguez Parrilla, considerando su probada experiencia en el impulso a los cambios actuales, asumiendo su cargo Luis Alberto Rodríguez López-Callejas. —No menos importante es echar un vistazo no menos especulativo a los mandos actuales de las FAR. Los generales de division “históricos” en sus 80 y algunos acercándose a los 90 como Ramiro Valdés Menéndez (88), vice-presidente Samuel Rodiles (89), Presidente del Instituto de Planificación Física, Ramón Espinosa Martín, Vice-Ministro de las FAR; Joaquín Quintas Solá (83), Leop[oldo Cintra Frías (80), ministro actual de las FAR. Podrán ser relevados por la llamada “generación de los africanos” por sus misiones militares en Africa y que hoy están en sus 60 y tanto y algunos ya entrando en los 70. Ellos podrán ser los generales de division y brigada como Onelio Aguilera (62), jefe del Ejército Occidental; Rafael Hernández (71, negro), Jefe del Ejército Oriental; Raúl Rodríguez Lobaina (71, negro), Jefe de Ejército Central y el recién designado Ministro del Interior, Lázaro A. Alvarez CaSAS (57), ex viceministro del MININT. Para Ministro de las FAR lo más seguro es que sea el favorito de Raúl Castro y actual Vice Inistro Priumero de las FAR, Alvaro López Miera (77). Pero en última instancia lo más esencial no será el movimiento de drigientes y mandos, sino los diseños de política hacia un viraje positivo o continuar aferrados al modelo probadamente inoperante que todavía prevalece.
The VIII Congress of the PCC: Possible Scenarios
by Domingo Amuchastegui
February 12, 2021
Received from the author by email.VIII CONGRESO DEL PCC: POSIBLES ESCENARIOS
Por Domingo Amuchastegui
12de febrero 2021
Recibido del autor por correo electrónico.
By Domingo Amuchastegui.
Translated and edited by Walter Lippmann for CubaNews.
Received by email January 27, 2020.
Written during the Trump administration.
Cuba today faces its most critical and complex situation. This is the result of the interaction of three factors. The most recent is the multifaceted impact of the arrival of the coronavirus or COVID-19, which ranges from damage to the health-care system and the population in general to the impact on its economy. Added to this is the economic war of the Trump administration against Cuba, and with a no less harmful gravitation, the persistence of a proven inoperative model that refuses to deepen and broaden the path of reforms.
In such a context, it is essential to examine the challenges and priorities that in the short and immediate term -and with a level of urgency as never before- the Cuban leadership will have to deal with and find the best and most lasting solutions to ensure its recovery and stabilization.
At the level of the INTERNAL SECTOR:
The need to minimize and reduce to a minimum the complexities and costs of the effects of the pandemic in the shortest possible time.
Undertake the redesign of the economic model with the necessary comprehensiveness and depth. This has been lacking in the reform measures adopted so far, which appear as isolated and incomplete patches that fail to energize the entire economy at the levels it requires. Let no one be scandalized by what I am saying. Let us recall Fidel Castro’s words to journalist Jeffrey Goldberg for the important US publication The Atlantic (9/8/2010): “The Cuban Model Doesn’t Even Work for Us Anymore”.
Such a redesign in which the state concentrates on what Cuban economists repeat over and over again: the fundamental means of production (key sectors) of the island (sugar industry, not its agricultural part; nickel/cobalt, biopharmaceuticals, tourism industry, exportable medical services, energy, citrus, fishing, rum and tobacco), which must be consistently opened to its association with foreign capital (an aspect that President Diaz-Canel and the Minister of Economy, Alejandro Gil, have been insisting on repeatedly, but still without translating them into actions and projects consistent with such an imperative).
At the same time, to get rid of the heavy and unproductive burden that has been represented for decades by the costly and unproductive ownership and administration of tens of thousands of small businesses that should be transferred to the cooperative and private sectors, in a broad and sustained project for the promotion of SMEs [Small and Medium Enterprises].
Recovery and effective dynamization of the key sectors mentioned above in terms of productivity and export capacity. SMEs -private, cooperatives and tenants or farmers- must be exempted from the tax burdens and bureaucratic interference that today slow down and asphyxiate their normal operation and development. This includes their more functional and flexible articulation to the export/import and financing processes and space in the national banking system. Open these sectors to investments by Cuban emigrants.
Specific issues of utmost importance are the need to: a) Significantly increase productivity levels and reduce production costs, especially in the tourism and biopharmaceutical industries; b) Eliminate the mechanisms of compulsory contracting by foreign companies through state agencies and the tax overload that this mechanism entails; c) Guarantee the sale of all goods and services to the Cuban economy, especially in the tourism and biopharmaceutical industries; d) Ensure the sale of all goods and services to foreign companies through state agencies and the tax overload that this mechanism entails; e) Ensure that all goods and services are sold in the Cuban market. To guarantee the sale of all supplies and equipment rental to SMEs (otherwise theft, corruption, and the so-called underground economy will continue to reign); d. To reduce by no less than 50% the tax on purchases in convertible currency stores (MLC).
Last but not least: To advance definitively, and in a comprehensive manner, in the process of monetary and exchange unification in order to stabilize in a real way the income of the population and the exchange and transfer of foreign companies operating in Cuba.
At the EXTERNAL SECTOR level:
To promptly and effectively face and settle foreign debt obligations as well as commercial credits owed.
In line with the official emphasis on the need to promote foreign investment (FI) as a strategic component, review and update the 2014 Investment Law in order to make it more attractive and encourage the arrival of foreign capital, including foreign direct investment (FDI) and other modalities that more effectively meet the requirements of foreign investment. Avoid at all costs, negotiating disasters such as those conducted with GLAXO and the Siemens/Total energy project, among others. Rationalize the Portfolio of Opportunities offered every year to foreign entrepreneurs attending the Havana International Fair (FIHAV), making it more selective and with greater incentives.
With the utmost urgency, design a strategy -and as an effective practice- to boost the growth of investments in the Special Development Zone of Mariel (ZEDM) and its Container Terminal, since so far its revenues barely cover its operating and maintenance costs. This project -the most important in the Cuban economy so far in the new century- may perish due to starvation or lack of relevant projects. Attracting important projects with the capacity to re-export to the entire region is no less indispensable.
It is time for the Cuban leadership to reflect on its pariah status with respect to the international financial system, its institutions and mechanisms, and to consider exploring and advancing in this direction, which could well begin through levels of association and cooperation with the World Bank. If successful in this approach to the World Bank, and considering that the OAS sanctions were lifted several years ago, Havana could manage -without a formal return to that organization- an approach that could be sponsored by CELAC members and that would result in some level of association and cooperation with the IDB. Such steps would undoubtedly serve to give confidence and encourage the flow of EI and credits to the Cuban economy.
Por Domingo Amuchastegui
Jan 27, 2021 8:57 AM
Cuba enfrenta hoy su más crítica y compleja situación. Ello es resultado de la interacción de tres factores. El más reciente lo constituye el impacto multifacético de la llegada del coronavirus o COVID-19, que va desde los perjuicios al sistema de salud y a la población en general hasta el impacto a su economía (Ver Coronovirus y Cuba). A esto se suma la guerra económica de la administración Trump contra Cuba, y con una gravitación no menos perjuidical, la persistencia de un modelo probadamente inoperante que se resiste a profundizar y ampliar el camino de las reformas.
En semejante contexto, resulta imprescindible un examen de los desafíos y prioridades que a corto e inmediato plazo -y con un nivel de urgencia como nunca antes- la dirigencia cubana tendrá que lidiar con ello y encontrar las mejores, y más duraderas, soluciones que aseguren su recuperación y estabilización.
A nivel de SECTOR INTERNO:
Aminorar y reducir al mínimo las complejidades y costos de los efectos de la pandemia en el más breve posible plazo.
Acometer el rediseño del modelo económico con la integralidad y profundidad necesaria, y de lo cual han carecido las medidas de reformas hasta ahora adoptadas, que aparecen como parches aislados e incompletes que no logran dinamizar la totalidad de la economíaa los niveles que la misma require. Nadie se escandalice por lo que planteo. Recordemos las palabras de Fidel Castro al periodista Jefrrey Goldberg para la importante publicación estadounidense The Atlantic (9/8/2010): “The Cuban Model Doesn’t Even Work for Us Anymore.”
Un rediseño tal en los cuales el Estado se concentre en lo que los economistas cubanos repiten una y otra vez: los medios fundamentales de producción (sectores claves) de la isla (industria azucarera, no su parte agrícola; níquel/cobalto, biofarmacéuitica, industria turística, servicios médicos exportables, energía, cítricos, pesca, ron y tabaco), que deben abrirse consistemente a su asociación con el capital extranjero (aspecto éste en el que viene insistiendo repeidamente el presidente Díaz-Canel y el Ministro de Economía, Alejandro Gil, pero todavía sin traducirse en acciones y proyectos consistentes con semejante imperativo).
Paralelamente, desembarazarse de la pesada e improductiva carga que ha venido representando durante décadas la propiedad y administración costosísima e improductiva de decenas de miles de pequeños negocios que deben ser transferidos a los sectores cooperativo y privado, en un Amplio y sostenido proyecto de fomento de las PYMES.
Recuperación y efectiva dinamización de los sectores claves antes apuntados en términos de productividad y capacidad exportadora. Las PYMES -privadas, cooperativas y arrendatarios o finqueros- deben ser eximidas de las cargas fiscales e injerencias burocráticas que frenan y asifixian hoy su normal funcionamiento y desarrollo, incluyendo su articulación más funcional y flexible a los procesos de exportación/importación y de financiamiento y un espacio en el sistema bancario nacional. Abrir estos sectores a las inversiones de la emigración cubana.
Cuestiones puntuales de suma importancia son: a) Aumentar sensiblemente los niveles de productividad y reducir costos de producción, en especial en la industria turística y en la biofarmacéutica; b) Suprimir los mecanismos de contratación obligatoria por compañías extranjeras por intermedio de agencias estatales y la sobrecarga impositiva que este mecanismo acompaña; c. Garantizar la venta de todos los suministros y alquier de equipos varios, a las PYMES (de lo contrario seguirán reinando el robo, la corrupción y la llamada economía sumergida); d. Reducir en no menos de un 50% el gravamen sobre las compras en los comercios en moneda convertible (MLC).
Por ultimo y no por ello de menor importancia: Avanzar definitivamente, y de manera integral, en el proceso de unificación monetaria y cambiaria a fin de estabilizar de manera real los ingresos de la población y de cambios y transferencias de las empresas extranjeras que operan en Cuba.
A nivel de SECTOR EXTERNO:
Afrontar y solventar con prontitud y eficacia las obligaciones de la deuda externa asi como de los créditos comerciales adeudados.
En consonancia con el énfasis oficial en la necesidad de promocionar como componente estratégico la inversion extranjera (IE), revisar y actualizar la Ley de Inversiones del 2014 en función de hacer más atractivo e incentivar la llegada del capital del capital extranjero, incluída de manera destacada la inversion extranjera directa (FDI) y otras modalidades que se ajusten más aficazmente a los requerimientos de la IE. Evitar a toda costa, desastres negociadores como las conducidos con GLAXO y el proyecto energético Siemens/Total, entre otros. Racionalizar la Cartera de Oportunidades que cada año se oferta a emporesarios extranjeros asistentes a la Feria Internacional de La Habana (FIHAV), haciéndola más selectiva y con mayores incentivos.
Con máxima urgencia, diseñar una estrategia -y una práctica efectiva- para dinamizar el crecimiento de las inversiones en la Zona especial de Desarrollo de Mariel (ZEDM) y su Terminal de Contenedores pues hasta ahora sus ingresos apenas cubren sus costos de operaciones y mantenimiento. Este proyecto -el más importante en la economía cubana en lo que va del nuevo siglo- puede perecer por inanición o ausencia de proyectos relevantes. Atraer proyectos de peso y con capacidad reexportadora hacia toda la region, es algo no menos indispensable.
Es hora ya de que la dirigencia cubana reflexione acerca de su status de paria con respecto al sistema financiero internacional, sus institucones y mecanismos, y considere explorar y avanzar en esta dirección que bien pudiera comenzar por medio de niveles de asociación y cooperación con el Banco Mundial. Caso de tener éxito en esta aporoximación al Banco Mundial, y onsiderando que las sanciones de la OEA ya fueron levantadas hace ya varios años, La Habana pudiera gestionar -sin un regreso formal a dicha organziación- gestion que pudiera ser auspiciada por miembros de la CELAC y que se tradujera en algún nivel de asociación y cooperación con el BID. Semejantes pasos, indudablemente, servirían para dar confianza e incentivar los flujos de IE y créditos parfa la economía cubana.
By Domingo Amuchastegui Having faced hostility, siege, aggression and sanctions from the U.S. for 60 years is no small thing in international relations, especially being a small island, with very scarce resources, located just 90 miles from the U.S. coast. It is now facing the toughest sanctions from the Trump administration, but it is surviving and still standing. A most unusual episode. Being the defunct Soviet Union its main ally, Havana did not hesitate to question, criticize and condemn, privately and publicly, different policies and actions of Moscow. Even more forceful were its clashes with China until the end of the 80s of the last century. Another very unusual episode in the field of alliances. “Toujour l’audace,” [“Always audacity”] was a guiding maxim of Havana, whether in its support of insurgent movements, of Vietnam in its critical years, of the surprising missile initiative that originated the most serious crisis of the so-called “cold war,” followed by the deployment of Cuban forces in Algeria, Angola and southern Africa or the Horn of Africa, all of them without consultation and contradicting Soviet and Chinese policies. Undoubtedly, a unique trajectory in these times. From another dimension, and for almost 30 years, the UN has witnessed almost unanimous votes condemning the US embargo against Cuba -which Washington continues to scorn- an unprecedented event in the multilateral system of relations of the post-World War II period. From a political-diplomatic siege for years agreed by the OAS -with the exception of Mexico- we have moved on to a situation today with reestablished relations with all its members, including the early recognition and cooperative relations between Cuba and CARICOM countries. No less relevant in this Latin American context have been Cuba’s notable contributions to the most important peace processes that have taken place in the region: Esquipulas, Guatemala and Colombia, while today from Norway to the Lima Group, from Prime Minister Trudeau to the head of the Spanish government, Pedro Sanchez, and six visits by the High Commissioner for Foreign Affairs and Security of the European Union (EU), Federica Mogherini, recognize and call for Cuba’s participation in the management and possible settlement of the Venezuelan crisis. It is worth recalling that, in the heat of the collapse of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, more than 200 foreign correspondents gathered in Havana in expectation of a similar outcome in Cuba. They were left waiting because it did not happen. Meanwhile, in subsequent decades, dozens of heads of state and governments visited Cuba in search of a closer and more constructive relationship. To enumerate such visits would be endless, from the French President Francois Hollande to Pedro Sanchez, President of the Spanish Government, to three Presidents of China, the President and Prime Minister of Russia, plus the Prime Ministers of Canada and Japan, Presidents of Chile, Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, Venezuela and others, as well as the visits of bitter Cuban-American enemies to Havana such as Carlos Carlos Gutierrez, Alfie Fanjul and Carlos Saladrigas, among others. The reasons for its non-collapse allow for easy answers, neither yesterday nor today. On the other hand, Havana, in spite of everything, has not ceased in its efforts to seek a normalization agreement with the US. At one time, John F. Kennedy himself even considered such a possibility and initiated contacts. With James Carter and Barack Obama, the first and only progress was made, culminating with the re-establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries. No less relevant has been Cuba’s sustained cooperation with U.S. institutions such as the DEA, the Coast Guard, and in the perimeter of the Guantanamo Naval Base, in addition to the close collaboration with Interpol. How can it be explained that the last three Popes (John Paul II, Benedict XVI and Francis) have visited Cuba and conversed with its main leaders? How can it be explained that the churches of Rome and Moscow agreed to meet, after more than a millennium of antagonism, not in Paris or Geneva, but in Havana? On the other hand, how can it be explained that the current Prime Minister of Japan, Shinzo Abe, visits Havana and that sometime later he sends his special envoy, Kenji Furuya, on a special mission so far surrounded by speculation? Or that Prince Charles of the United Kingdom or the King and Queen of Spain decide to visit Havana at a time when Cuba’s relations with the United States are at their most critical level due to the economic and political-diplomatic war unleashed by the Trump administration against Cuba? And today, in the face of Trump’s current policy towards Cuba, the EU, its main authorities and several of its most important members such as Spain and France, reject the application of Title III of the Helms-Burton Act, its extraterritoriality and illegal attempt to sanction those European and other countries’ companies involved in Cuba’s economic relations. Canada has done the same. All these factors have neutralized and weakened the implications of such an application, representing another setback for U.S. diplomacy against Cuba. Finally, let us remember: This is a small island, with no economy of scale, with very scarce resources, a pariah of the international financial system (IMF-WB-IDB), facing all kinds of limitations and diverse internal shortcomings, which may be the subject of objections and criticisms of very different kinds. But the undeniable fact has been and continues to be its singular stature in the international arena and which seems to bear no correspondence with its internal situation. Have the political genius of Fidel Castro and the heroic magnitude of Che Guevara been responsible for their disjunct international performance? Or perhaps their social projects at home and in the Third World arevof particular transcendence? Or perhaps the examples they may suggest, together with their proposals and initiatives for the resolution of not a few conflicts, their gravitation in the system of international relations (UN, Group of 77, Non-Aligned, CELAC, CARICOM and others), together with their extended and very active political-diplomatic network with its state and non-state components? And, perhaps, why not? Theere is always valid image of David versus Goliath? Let us avoid simplifications in order to give an answer to this singular case. The future may increase or reduce its specific gravity, but its singular protagonism is worthy of in-depth study. It is a challenge to rigorous inquiry for a better understanding of the Cuban case.
Por Domingo Amuchastegui Haber enfrentado la hostilidad, asedio, agresiones y sanciones de EEUU durante 60 años no es poca cosa en materia de relaciones internacionales, sobre todo siendo una pequeña isla, de muy escasos recursos, situada apenas a 90 millas de las costas norteamericanas. Ahora enfrenta las mayores sanciones de parte de la administración Trump, pero sobrevive y sigue en pie. Episodio bien insólito. Siendo la fenecida Unión Soviética su principal aliado, La Habana no vaciló en cuestionar, criticar y condenar a ésta, de manera privada y pública, diferentes políticas y acciones de Moscú. Con más fuerza todavía fueron sus choques con China hasta fines de los 80 del siglo pasado. Otro episodio bien insólito en el campo de las alianzas. “Toujour l’audace,” fue una máxima rectora de La Habana, ya fuera en su apoyo de movimientos insurgents, de Vietnam en sus años críticos, de la sorpresiva iniciativa de cohetes que originaron la más grave crisis de la llamada “guerra fría,” seguido por los despliegues de fuerzas cubanas en Argelia, Angola y el sur de Africa o el Cuerno de Africa, todas ellas sin consultar y contradiciendo políticas soviéticas y chinas. Sin dudas, una trayectoria única en estos tiempos. Desde otra dimensión, y por casi 30 años, la ONU ha sido testigo de votaciones casi unánimes, condenando el embargo de EEUU contra Cuba -y que Washington sigue menospreciando- es un hecho sin precedentes en el sistema multilateral de relaciones de la segunda postguerra. De un cerco politico-diplomatico por años acordado por la OEA -con la excepción de México- se ha pasado a una situación hoy con relaciones restablecidas con todos sus miembros, incluyendo el temprano reconocimiento y relaciones de cooperación entre Cuba y países del CARICOM. No menos relevante en este contexto latinoamericano, han sido las notables contribuciones de Cuba a los procesos de paz más importantes que han tenido lugar en la región: Esquipulas, Guatemala y Colombia, mientras que hoy desde Noruega hasta el Grupo de Lima, desde el premier Trudeau hasta el jefe del gobierno español, Pedro Sánchez, y seis visitas de la Alta Comisionada de Relaciones Exteriores y Seguridad de la Unión Europea (UE), Federica Mogherini, reconocen y convocan la participación de Cuba en el manejo y posible arreglo de la crisis venezolana. Vale recordar que, al calor del derrumbe de Europa Oriental y la Unión Soviética, más de 200 corresponsales extranjeros se congregaron en La Habana a la espera de un desenlace similar en Cuba. Se quedaron esperando pues ello no tuvo lugar. Mientras, en décadas posteriores, decenas de jefes de Estado y Gobierno visitaban Cuba en búsqueda de una relación más estrecha y constructiva. Enumerar dichas visitas sería interminable, desde el presidente francés Francois Hollande hasta Pedro Sánchez, presidente del gobierno español hasta tres presidentes de China, el presidente y el primer ministro de Rusia, más los primeros ministros de Canadá y Japón, presidentes de Chile, Brasil, Colombia, México, Venezuela y otros.No menos relevante han sido las visitas de enconados enemigos cubano-americanos a la La Habana como Carlos Guti♪0rrez, Alfie Fanjul y Carlos Saladrigas, entre otros. Las razones de su no colapso no admite respuestas fáciles, ni ayer ni hoy. Por otra parte, La Habana, a pesar de todo, no ha cejado en su empeño de procurar un acuerdo de normalización con EEUU. En su momento el propio Johan F. Kennedy llegó a razonar tal posibilidad e iniciar contactos. Con James Carter y Barack Obama, se lograron los primeros y únicos avances, culminando con el restablecmiento de relaciones diplomáticas entre ambos países. No menos relevante, ha sido la sostenida cooperación de Cuba con insituciones norteaericanas como la DEA, los Guardacostas y en el perímetro de la Base Naval de Guantánamo, además de la estrecha colaboración con la Interpol. Desde otra dimension más que singular ¿Cómo se explica que los tres últimos Papas (Juan Pablo II, Benedicto XVI y Francisco hayan visitado Cuba y conversado con sus principales dirigentes? ¿Cómo explicar que las Iglesias de Roma y Moscú acordaran reunirse, tras más de un milenio de antagonismos, no en París o Ginebra, sino en La Habana? Por otro lado, ¿cómo se explica que el actual premier de Japón, Shinzo Abe, visite La Habana y que tiempo después haga llegar su envíado especial, Kenji Furuya, en una misión especial hasta ahora rodeada de especulaciones? ¿O que el príncipe Carlos del Reino Unido o los reyes de España decidan visitar La Habana en el momento en que las relaciones de Cuba con EEUU llegan a su nivel más crítico debido a la guerra económica y política-diplomática desatada por la administración Trump contra Cuba? Y hoy, frente a la política actual de Trump hacia Cuba, la UE, sus principales autoridades y varios de sus más importantes miembros como España y Francia, rechazan la aplicación del Título III de la Ley Helms-Burton, su extraterritorialidad e ilegal intento por sancioner aquellas empresas europeas y de otros países que participan en las relaciones económicas de Cuba. Canadá ha hecho otro tanto. Todos estos factores ellos neutralizado y debilitado las implicaciones de semejante aplicación, representando otro revés de la diplomacia norteamericana contra Cuba. Por ultimo, recordemos: Se trata de una pequeña isla, sin una esconomía de escala, de muy escasos recursos, paria del sistema financiero internacional (FMI-BM-BID), enfrentada a todo género de limitaciones y carencias diversas a lo interno, que podrá ser tema para objeciones y críticas de factura muy diferentes, pero lo inobjetable ha sido y continúa siendo su singular estatura en el quehacer internacional y que parecería no guardar correspondencia alguna con su situación interna. ¿Han sido el genio politico de Fidel Castro y la magnitud heroica de un Ché Guevara responsables por desemjante desempeño internacional? ¿ O acaso sus proyectos sociales a lo interno y a escala del Tercer Mundo de particular trascendencia? ¿Acaso los ejemplos que estos pueden sugerir junto a sus propuestas e iniciativas para la resolución de no pocos conflictos, su gravitación en el sistema de relaciones internacionales (ONU, Grupo de los 77, No Alineados, CELAC, CARICOM y otros), junto a su extendida y muy activa red política-diplomática con sus componentes estatales y no estatales? Y, tal vez ¿por qué no? La imagen siempre válida de David versus Goliat… Evitemos las simplifcaciones para dar respuesta a este singular caso. El futuro podrá acrecentar o reducir su gravitación, pero su singular protagonismo es digno de estudiarse con profundidad. Es un un reto a la indagación rigurosa para una mayor comprensión del caso cubano.
Cuba: Sixty Years as a Unique International Actor
Translated and edited by Walter Lippmann for CubaNews.
[Received via email on January 27, 2021. Evidently written during the Trump presidency.]60 Años de un singular actor internacional: Cuba
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