By Domingo Amuchastegui.
Translated and edited by Walter Lippmann for CubaNews.
Received by email January 27, 2020.
Written during the Trump administration.
Cuba today faces its most critical and complex situation. This is the result of the interaction of three factors. The most recent is the multifaceted impact of the arrival of the coronavirus or COVID-19, which ranges from damage to the health-care system and the population in general to the impact on its economy. Added to this is the economic war of the Trump administration against Cuba, and with a no less harmful gravitation, the persistence of a proven inoperative model that refuses to deepen and broaden the path of reforms.
In such a context, it is essential to examine the challenges and priorities that in the short and immediate term -and with a level of urgency as never before- the Cuban leadership will have to deal with and find the best and most lasting solutions to ensure its recovery and stabilization.
At the level of the INTERNAL SECTOR:
The need to minimize and reduce to a minimum the complexities and costs of the effects of the pandemic in the shortest possible time.
Undertake the redesign of the economic model with the necessary comprehensiveness and depth. This has been lacking in the reform measures adopted so far, which appear as isolated and incomplete patches that fail to energize the entire economy at the levels it requires. Let no one be scandalized by what I am saying. Let us recall Fidel Castro’s words to journalist Jeffrey Goldberg for the important US publication The Atlantic (9/8/2010): “The Cuban Model Doesn’t Even Work for Us Anymore”.
Such a redesign in which the state concentrates on what Cuban economists repeat over and over again: the fundamental means of production (key sectors) of the island (sugar industry, not its agricultural part; nickel/cobalt, biopharmaceuticals, tourism industry, exportable medical services, energy, citrus, fishing, rum and tobacco), which must be consistently opened to its association with foreign capital (an aspect that President Diaz-Canel and the Minister of Economy, Alejandro Gil, have been insisting on repeatedly, but still without translating them into actions and projects consistent with such an imperative).
At the same time, to get rid of the heavy and unproductive burden that has been represented for decades by the costly and unproductive ownership and administration of tens of thousands of small businesses that should be transferred to the cooperative and private sectors, in a broad and sustained project for the promotion of SMEs [Small and Medium Enterprises].
Recovery and effective dynamization of the key sectors mentioned above in terms of productivity and export capacity. SMEs -private, cooperatives and tenants or farmers- must be exempted from the tax burdens and bureaucratic interference that today slow down and asphyxiate their normal operation and development. This includes their more functional and flexible articulation to the export/import and financing processes and space in the national banking system. Open these sectors to investments by Cuban emigrants.
Specific issues of utmost importance are the need to: a) Significantly increase productivity levels and reduce production costs, especially in the tourism and biopharmaceutical industries; b) Eliminate the mechanisms of compulsory contracting by foreign companies through state agencies and the tax overload that this mechanism entails; c) Guarantee the sale of all goods and services to the Cuban economy, especially in the tourism and biopharmaceutical industries; d) Ensure the sale of all goods and services to foreign companies through state agencies and the tax overload that this mechanism entails; e) Ensure that all goods and services are sold in the Cuban market. To guarantee the sale of all supplies and equipment rental to SMEs (otherwise theft, corruption, and the so-called underground economy will continue to reign); d. To reduce by no less than 50% the tax on purchases in convertible currency stores (MLC).
Last but not least: To advance definitively, and in a comprehensive manner, in the process of monetary and exchange unification in order to stabilize in a real way the income of the population and the exchange and transfer of foreign companies operating in Cuba.
At the EXTERNAL SECTOR level:
To promptly and effectively face and settle foreign debt obligations as well as commercial credits owed.
In line with the official emphasis on the need to promote foreign investment (FI) as a strategic component, review and update the 2014 Investment Law in order to make it more attractive and encourage the arrival of foreign capital, including foreign direct investment (FDI) and other modalities that more effectively meet the requirements of foreign investment. Avoid at all costs, negotiating disasters such as those conducted with GLAXO and the Siemens/Total energy project, among others. Rationalize the Portfolio of Opportunities offered every year to foreign entrepreneurs attending the Havana International Fair (FIHAV), making it more selective and with greater incentives.
With the utmost urgency, design a strategy -and as an effective practice- to boost the growth of investments in the Special Development Zone of Mariel (ZEDM) and its Container Terminal, since so far its revenues barely cover its operating and maintenance costs. This project -the most important in the Cuban economy so far in the new century- may perish due to starvation or lack of relevant projects. Attracting important projects with the capacity to re-export to the entire region is no less indispensable.
It is time for the Cuban leadership to reflect on its pariah status with respect to the international financial system, its institutions and mechanisms, and to consider exploring and advancing in this direction, which could well begin through levels of association and cooperation with the World Bank. If successful in this approach to the World Bank, and considering that the OAS sanctions were lifted several years ago, Havana could manage -without a formal return to that organization- an approach that could be sponsored by CELAC members and that would result in some level of association and cooperation with the IDB. Such steps would undoubtedly serve to give confidence and encourage the flow of EI and credits to the Cuban economy.
Por Domingo Amuchastegui
Jan 27, 2021 8:57 AM
Cuba enfrenta hoy su más crítica y compleja situación. Ello es resultado de la interacción de tres factores. El más reciente lo constituye el impacto multifacético de la llegada del coronavirus o COVID-19, que va desde los perjuicios al sistema de salud y a la población en general hasta el impacto a su economía (Ver Coronovirus y Cuba). A esto se suma la guerra económica de la administración Trump contra Cuba, y con una gravitación no menos perjuidical, la persistencia de un modelo probadamente inoperante que se resiste a profundizar y ampliar el camino de las reformas.
En semejante contexto, resulta imprescindible un examen de los desafíos y prioridades que a corto e inmediato plazo -y con un nivel de urgencia como nunca antes- la dirigencia cubana tendrá que lidiar con ello y encontrar las mejores, y más duraderas, soluciones que aseguren su recuperación y estabilización.
A nivel de SECTOR INTERNO:
Aminorar y reducir al mínimo las complejidades y costos de los efectos de la pandemia en el más breve posible plazo.
Acometer el rediseño del modelo económico con la integralidad y profundidad necesaria, y de lo cual han carecido las medidas de reformas hasta ahora adoptadas, que aparecen como parches aislados e incompletes que no logran dinamizar la totalidad de la economíaa los niveles que la misma require. Nadie se escandalice por lo que planteo. Recordemos las palabras de Fidel Castro al periodista Jefrrey Goldberg para la importante publicación estadounidense The Atlantic (9/8/2010): “The Cuban Model Doesn’t Even Work for Us Anymore.”
Un rediseño tal en los cuales el Estado se concentre en lo que los economistas cubanos repiten una y otra vez: los medios fundamentales de producción (sectores claves) de la isla (industria azucarera, no su parte agrícola; níquel/cobalto, biofarmacéuitica, industria turística, servicios médicos exportables, energía, cítricos, pesca, ron y tabaco), que deben abrirse consistemente a su asociación con el capital extranjero (aspecto éste en el que viene insistiendo repeidamente el presidente Díaz-Canel y el Ministro de Economía, Alejandro Gil, pero todavía sin traducirse en acciones y proyectos consistentes con semejante imperativo).
Paralelamente, desembarazarse de la pesada e improductiva carga que ha venido representando durante décadas la propiedad y administración costosísima e improductiva de decenas de miles de pequeños negocios que deben ser transferidos a los sectores cooperativo y privado, en un Amplio y sostenido proyecto de fomento de las PYMES.
Recuperación y efectiva dinamización de los sectores claves antes apuntados en términos de productividad y capacidad exportadora. Las PYMES -privadas, cooperativas y arrendatarios o finqueros- deben ser eximidas de las cargas fiscales e injerencias burocráticas que frenan y asifixian hoy su normal funcionamiento y desarrollo, incluyendo su articulación más funcional y flexible a los procesos de exportación/importación y de financiamiento y un espacio en el sistema bancario nacional. Abrir estos sectores a las inversiones de la emigración cubana.
Cuestiones puntuales de suma importancia son: a) Aumentar sensiblemente los niveles de productividad y reducir costos de producción, en especial en la industria turística y en la biofarmacéutica; b) Suprimir los mecanismos de contratación obligatoria por compañías extranjeras por intermedio de agencias estatales y la sobrecarga impositiva que este mecanismo acompaña; c. Garantizar la venta de todos los suministros y alquier de equipos varios, a las PYMES (de lo contrario seguirán reinando el robo, la corrupción y la llamada economía sumergida); d. Reducir en no menos de un 50% el gravamen sobre las compras en los comercios en moneda convertible (MLC).
Por ultimo y no por ello de menor importancia: Avanzar definitivamente, y de manera integral, en el proceso de unificación monetaria y cambiaria a fin de estabilizar de manera real los ingresos de la población y de cambios y transferencias de las empresas extranjeras que operan en Cuba.
A nivel de SECTOR EXTERNO:
Afrontar y solventar con prontitud y eficacia las obligaciones de la deuda externa asi como de los créditos comerciales adeudados.
En consonancia con el énfasis oficial en la necesidad de promocionar como componente estratégico la inversion extranjera (IE), revisar y actualizar la Ley de Inversiones del 2014 en función de hacer más atractivo e incentivar la llegada del capital del capital extranjero, incluída de manera destacada la inversion extranjera directa (FDI) y otras modalidades que se ajusten más aficazmente a los requerimientos de la IE. Evitar a toda costa, desastres negociadores como las conducidos con GLAXO y el proyecto energético Siemens/Total, entre otros. Racionalizar la Cartera de Oportunidades que cada año se oferta a emporesarios extranjeros asistentes a la Feria Internacional de La Habana (FIHAV), haciéndola más selectiva y con mayores incentivos.
Con máxima urgencia, diseñar una estrategia -y una práctica efectiva- para dinamizar el crecimiento de las inversiones en la Zona especial de Desarrollo de Mariel (ZEDM) y su Terminal de Contenedores pues hasta ahora sus ingresos apenas cubren sus costos de operaciones y mantenimiento. Este proyecto -el más importante en la economía cubana en lo que va del nuevo siglo- puede perecer por inanición o ausencia de proyectos relevantes. Atraer proyectos de peso y con capacidad reexportadora hacia toda la region, es algo no menos indispensable.
Es hora ya de que la dirigencia cubana reflexione acerca de su status de paria con respecto al sistema financiero internacional, sus institucones y mecanismos, y considere explorar y avanzar en esta dirección que bien pudiera comenzar por medio de niveles de asociación y cooperación con el Banco Mundial. Caso de tener éxito en esta aporoximación al Banco Mundial, y onsiderando que las sanciones de la OEA ya fueron levantadas hace ya varios años, La Habana pudiera gestionar -sin un regreso formal a dicha organziación- gestion que pudiera ser auspiciada por miembros de la CELAC y que se tradujera en algún nivel de asociación y cooperación con el BID. Semejantes pasos, indudablemente, servirían para dar confianza e incentivar los flujos de IE y créditos parfa la economía cubana.
By Domingo Amuchastegui Having faced hostility, siege, aggression and sanctions from the U.S. for 60 years is no small thing in international relations, especially being a small island, with very scarce resources, located just 90 miles from the U.S. coast. It is now facing the toughest sanctions from the Trump administration, but it is surviving and still standing. A most unusual episode. Being the defunct Soviet Union its main ally, Havana did not hesitate to question, criticize and condemn, privately and publicly, different policies and actions of Moscow. Even more forceful were its clashes with China until the end of the 80s of the last century. Another very unusual episode in the field of alliances. “Toujour l’audace,” [“Always audacity”] was a guiding maxim of Havana, whether in its support of insurgent movements, of Vietnam in its critical years, of the surprising missile initiative that originated the most serious crisis of the so-called “cold war,” followed by the deployment of Cuban forces in Algeria, Angola and southern Africa or the Horn of Africa, all of them without consultation and contradicting Soviet and Chinese policies. Undoubtedly, a unique trajectory in these times. From another dimension, and for almost 30 years, the UN has witnessed almost unanimous votes condemning the US embargo against Cuba -which Washington continues to scorn- an unprecedented event in the multilateral system of relations of the post-World War II period. From a political-diplomatic siege for years agreed by the OAS -with the exception of Mexico- we have moved on to a situation today with reestablished relations with all its members, including the early recognition and cooperative relations between Cuba and CARICOM countries. No less relevant in this Latin American context have been Cuba’s notable contributions to the most important peace processes that have taken place in the region: Esquipulas, Guatemala and Colombia, while today from Norway to the Lima Group, from Prime Minister Trudeau to the head of the Spanish government, Pedro Sanchez, and six visits by the High Commissioner for Foreign Affairs and Security of the European Union (EU), Federica Mogherini, recognize and call for Cuba’s participation in the management and possible settlement of the Venezuelan crisis. It is worth recalling that, in the heat of the collapse of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, more than 200 foreign correspondents gathered in Havana in expectation of a similar outcome in Cuba. They were left waiting because it did not happen. Meanwhile, in subsequent decades, dozens of heads of state and governments visited Cuba in search of a closer and more constructive relationship. To enumerate such visits would be endless, from the French President Francois Hollande to Pedro Sanchez, President of the Spanish Government, to three Presidents of China, the President and Prime Minister of Russia, plus the Prime Ministers of Canada and Japan, Presidents of Chile, Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, Venezuela and others, as well as the visits of bitter Cuban-American enemies to Havana such as Carlos Carlos Gutierrez, Alfie Fanjul and Carlos Saladrigas, among others. The reasons for its non-collapse allow for easy answers, neither yesterday nor today. On the other hand, Havana, in spite of everything, has not ceased in its efforts to seek a normalization agreement with the US. At one time, John F. Kennedy himself even considered such a possibility and initiated contacts. With James Carter and Barack Obama, the first and only progress was made, culminating with the re-establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries. No less relevant has been Cuba’s sustained cooperation with U.S. institutions such as the DEA, the Coast Guard, and in the perimeter of the Guantanamo Naval Base, in addition to the close collaboration with Interpol. How can it be explained that the last three Popes (John Paul II, Benedict XVI and Francis) have visited Cuba and conversed with its main leaders? How can it be explained that the churches of Rome and Moscow agreed to meet, after more than a millennium of antagonism, not in Paris or Geneva, but in Havana? On the other hand, how can it be explained that the current Prime Minister of Japan, Shinzo Abe, visits Havana and that sometime later he sends his special envoy, Kenji Furuya, on a special mission so far surrounded by speculation? Or that Prince Charles of the United Kingdom or the King and Queen of Spain decide to visit Havana at a time when Cuba’s relations with the United States are at their most critical level due to the economic and political-diplomatic war unleashed by the Trump administration against Cuba? And today, in the face of Trump’s current policy towards Cuba, the EU, its main authorities and several of its most important members such as Spain and France, reject the application of Title III of the Helms-Burton Act, its extraterritoriality and illegal attempt to sanction those European and other countries’ companies involved in Cuba’s economic relations. Canada has done the same. All these factors have neutralized and weakened the implications of such an application, representing another setback for U.S. diplomacy against Cuba. Finally, let us remember: This is a small island, with no economy of scale, with very scarce resources, a pariah of the international financial system (IMF-WB-IDB), facing all kinds of limitations and diverse internal shortcomings, which may be the subject of objections and criticisms of very different kinds. But the undeniable fact has been and continues to be its singular stature in the international arena and which seems to bear no correspondence with its internal situation. Have the political genius of Fidel Castro and the heroic magnitude of Che Guevara been responsible for their disjunct international performance? Or perhaps their social projects at home and in the Third World arevof particular transcendence? Or perhaps the examples they may suggest, together with their proposals and initiatives for the resolution of not a few conflicts, their gravitation in the system of international relations (UN, Group of 77, Non-Aligned, CELAC, CARICOM and others), together with their extended and very active political-diplomatic network with its state and non-state components? And, perhaps, why not? Theere is always valid image of David versus Goliath? Let us avoid simplifications in order to give an answer to this singular case. The future may increase or reduce its specific gravity, but its singular protagonism is worthy of in-depth study. It is a challenge to rigorous inquiry for a better understanding of the Cuban case.
Por Domingo Amuchastegui Haber enfrentado la hostilidad, asedio, agresiones y sanciones de EEUU durante 60 años no es poca cosa en materia de relaciones internacionales, sobre todo siendo una pequeña isla, de muy escasos recursos, situada apenas a 90 millas de las costas norteamericanas. Ahora enfrenta las mayores sanciones de parte de la administración Trump, pero sobrevive y sigue en pie. Episodio bien insólito. Siendo la fenecida Unión Soviética su principal aliado, La Habana no vaciló en cuestionar, criticar y condenar a ésta, de manera privada y pública, diferentes políticas y acciones de Moscú. Con más fuerza todavía fueron sus choques con China hasta fines de los 80 del siglo pasado. Otro episodio bien insólito en el campo de las alianzas. “Toujour l’audace,” fue una máxima rectora de La Habana, ya fuera en su apoyo de movimientos insurgents, de Vietnam en sus años críticos, de la sorpresiva iniciativa de cohetes que originaron la más grave crisis de la llamada “guerra fría,” seguido por los despliegues de fuerzas cubanas en Argelia, Angola y el sur de Africa o el Cuerno de Africa, todas ellas sin consultar y contradiciendo políticas soviéticas y chinas. Sin dudas, una trayectoria única en estos tiempos. Desde otra dimensión, y por casi 30 años, la ONU ha sido testigo de votaciones casi unánimes, condenando el embargo de EEUU contra Cuba -y que Washington sigue menospreciando- es un hecho sin precedentes en el sistema multilateral de relaciones de la segunda postguerra. De un cerco politico-diplomatico por años acordado por la OEA -con la excepción de México- se ha pasado a una situación hoy con relaciones restablecidas con todos sus miembros, incluyendo el temprano reconocimiento y relaciones de cooperación entre Cuba y países del CARICOM. No menos relevante en este contexto latinoamericano, han sido las notables contribuciones de Cuba a los procesos de paz más importantes que han tenido lugar en la región: Esquipulas, Guatemala y Colombia, mientras que hoy desde Noruega hasta el Grupo de Lima, desde el premier Trudeau hasta el jefe del gobierno español, Pedro Sánchez, y seis visitas de la Alta Comisionada de Relaciones Exteriores y Seguridad de la Unión Europea (UE), Federica Mogherini, reconocen y convocan la participación de Cuba en el manejo y posible arreglo de la crisis venezolana. Vale recordar que, al calor del derrumbe de Europa Oriental y la Unión Soviética, más de 200 corresponsales extranjeros se congregaron en La Habana a la espera de un desenlace similar en Cuba. Se quedaron esperando pues ello no tuvo lugar. Mientras, en décadas posteriores, decenas de jefes de Estado y Gobierno visitaban Cuba en búsqueda de una relación más estrecha y constructiva. Enumerar dichas visitas sería interminable, desde el presidente francés Francois Hollande hasta Pedro Sánchez, presidente del gobierno español hasta tres presidentes de China, el presidente y el primer ministro de Rusia, más los primeros ministros de Canadá y Japón, presidentes de Chile, Brasil, Colombia, México, Venezuela y otros.No menos relevante han sido las visitas de enconados enemigos cubano-americanos a la La Habana como Carlos Guti♪0rrez, Alfie Fanjul y Carlos Saladrigas, entre otros. Las razones de su no colapso no admite respuestas fáciles, ni ayer ni hoy. Por otra parte, La Habana, a pesar de todo, no ha cejado en su empeño de procurar un acuerdo de normalización con EEUU. En su momento el propio Johan F. Kennedy llegó a razonar tal posibilidad e iniciar contactos. Con James Carter y Barack Obama, se lograron los primeros y únicos avances, culminando con el restablecmiento de relaciones diplomáticas entre ambos países. No menos relevante, ha sido la sostenida cooperación de Cuba con insituciones norteaericanas como la DEA, los Guardacostas y en el perímetro de la Base Naval de Guantánamo, además de la estrecha colaboración con la Interpol. Desde otra dimension más que singular ¿Cómo se explica que los tres últimos Papas (Juan Pablo II, Benedicto XVI y Francisco hayan visitado Cuba y conversado con sus principales dirigentes? ¿Cómo explicar que las Iglesias de Roma y Moscú acordaran reunirse, tras más de un milenio de antagonismos, no en París o Ginebra, sino en La Habana? Por otro lado, ¿cómo se explica que el actual premier de Japón, Shinzo Abe, visite La Habana y que tiempo después haga llegar su envíado especial, Kenji Furuya, en una misión especial hasta ahora rodeada de especulaciones? ¿O que el príncipe Carlos del Reino Unido o los reyes de España decidan visitar La Habana en el momento en que las relaciones de Cuba con EEUU llegan a su nivel más crítico debido a la guerra económica y política-diplomática desatada por la administración Trump contra Cuba? Y hoy, frente a la política actual de Trump hacia Cuba, la UE, sus principales autoridades y varios de sus más importantes miembros como España y Francia, rechazan la aplicación del Título III de la Ley Helms-Burton, su extraterritorialidad e ilegal intento por sancioner aquellas empresas europeas y de otros países que participan en las relaciones económicas de Cuba. Canadá ha hecho otro tanto. Todos estos factores ellos neutralizado y debilitado las implicaciones de semejante aplicación, representando otro revés de la diplomacia norteamericana contra Cuba. Por ultimo, recordemos: Se trata de una pequeña isla, sin una esconomía de escala, de muy escasos recursos, paria del sistema financiero internacional (FMI-BM-BID), enfrentada a todo género de limitaciones y carencias diversas a lo interno, que podrá ser tema para objeciones y críticas de factura muy diferentes, pero lo inobjetable ha sido y continúa siendo su singular estatura en el quehacer internacional y que parecería no guardar correspondencia alguna con su situación interna. ¿Han sido el genio politico de Fidel Castro y la magnitud heroica de un Ché Guevara responsables por desemjante desempeño internacional? ¿ O acaso sus proyectos sociales a lo interno y a escala del Tercer Mundo de particular trascendencia? ¿Acaso los ejemplos que estos pueden sugerir junto a sus propuestas e iniciativas para la resolución de no pocos conflictos, su gravitación en el sistema de relaciones internacionales (ONU, Grupo de los 77, No Alineados, CELAC, CARICOM y otros), junto a su extendida y muy activa red política-diplomática con sus componentes estatales y no estatales? Y, tal vez ¿por qué no? La imagen siempre válida de David versus Goliat… Evitemos las simplifcaciones para dar respuesta a este singular caso. El futuro podrá acrecentar o reducir su gravitación, pero su singular protagonismo es digno de estudiarse con profundidad. Es un un reto a la indagación rigurosa para una mayor comprensión del caso cubano.
Cuba: Sixty Years as a Unique International Actor
Translated and edited by Walter Lippmann for CubaNews.
[Received via email on January 27, 2021. Evidently written during the Trump presidency.]60 Años de un singular actor internacional: Cuba
By Domingo Amuchastegui
Received January 27, 2021 in English
In late December 2016, during the economic debates at Cuba’s National Assembly, Agustín Lage Dávila –renown Cuban scientist- publicly questioned the absence of explicit financial support to scientific institutions, making an urgent appeal to meet such needs (See my January 2017 column). The demand was most unusual; in fact, it was a serious warning. At that time, there were no official comments or reply from the new Minister of Economy and Planning, Ricardo Cabrisas or any other official…at least publicly.
A month later, it was obvious that Lage’s warning was not an isolated statement. Most Cuban scientists and experts, shared the following approach: “It is evident that among ourselves there isn’t full understanding about this vital issue (the proper and necessary funding for scientific development) and that it is required to go deeper in its analysis to be able to start effective actions, that today become very urgent.” The usual funds assigned at the beginning of every fiscal year for R&D and Science and Technology Activities (ACT in Spanish), had explicitly “disappeared” from the 2017 budget Supporting this view there were scientists and experts key institutions from the Ministry of Technology and Environment, Higher Education Ministry, BioCubaFarma, and others.
Furthermore, it was pointed out that over the last 10 years GDP growth did not include any increment in resources assigned to I+D, bringing down its contribution to the GDP to 0.42 percent. As a consequence, and despite some successes, scientific potentials were weakened. Resources to support the development of science in Cuba –together with taking pride in its biotech/pharmaceutical achievements- must be clearly stated in the nation’s budget seeking to promote I+D and ACT, putting an end to such negative trends.
Some may argue that currently –resulting from policies of economic decentralization- scientific institutions are allowed to invest a portion of its proceeds in ACT, but the truth is that such funds are extremely modest and are kept at a very low level due to current government policies. At the same time, exports coming from the field of science have been dragging for several years now the default in payments from some of Cuba’s largest markets like Venezuela, Angola, and others, thus aggravating its financial needs.
In recent years, again and again, it has become a familiar pattern to read in Cuba’s official economic reports about “the decline of exports of goods and services.” One important segment of such declining feature is connected, precisely, to that of the declining trend in the field of biotech/pharmaceutical research, production, and exports, including serious shortages in the local markets (hospitals and pharmacies), a most unusual problem.
Among Cuban scientists and experts some of the most relevant, and persistent, proposals and recommendation are the following:
— Funds for ACT should be a priority.
— Access to risk capitals is another option to explore.
— The new law to be discussed in the near future must include basic principals connected to ACT in the field of business operations.
— Resorting to foreign investment, putting an end to the official refusal to open up to such possibility. The example of how this can benefit scientific potentials and technologies can be found in the many benefits that foreign investment has added to Cuba’s nickel and oil industries.
–Keeping higher education institutions isolated from business-like projects and investments should come to an end, as well as their right to retain proceeds and benefits from such ties. Outdated legislation in this particular field should come to an end.
–A sound policy of stimulating those who excel in their work and achievements.
Government policies and actions need to pay very special attention, and care, to this situation, considering how important this field has been to Cuba’s development, economy, and also its international prestige. They cannot continue to turn their backs to such demands. A sense of urgency and the sound recommendations put in place, must not be overlooked nor postponed anymore.
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