A CubaNews translation.
Edited by Walter Lippmann.
Ladies & gentleman, now from Cuba
what’s up with Cuba why do we wanna do it in English for
say it in Spanish HELLO !
Tell me, how you’ve been, if you have found happiness
Tell me how are you doing? I’m doing fine
what’s up with you? Charanga Habanera !
they say she’s feeling OK that Miami is madness,
but she misses Havana, gossip and ‘sabrosura’
they say she has money, the car she always dreamed of
but she can’t find in Miami , what she left behind in Havana!
Let me tell you what happened to me
I loved her so, but she upped and go!
Lachy! she wanted to be famous, she wanted to win a Grammy
and so she went to try her luck in a plane for Miami
(David ) hey chacal (jackal)….. I heard you
they say she’s feeling OK that Miami is madness,
but she misses Havana, gossip and ‘sabrosura’
they say she has money, the car she always dreamed of
but she can’t find in Miami , what she left behind in Havana!
lies, lies
(rap by chacal …………)
what’s the point in crying
you left, now you suffer, there is no two ways about it
What are you doing with micky mouse if who you like is elpidio valdes?
audi for me,…..
I don’t want to pretend , I eat minced meat and I am happy
(rap chacal …………)
(Dantes) And now she calls me crying, saying she can’t find her way
that she’s not happy, that she misses everything Cuban
she misses the Van Van , Hectico and PMM
she misses the Charanga , and the man she wants
(Randy mc) I keep on charangueando the way I like
You’re crying in Miami, and I’m living it up in Havana
You’re crying in Miami, and I’m living it up in Havana
she’s sad because they don’t have the Capri or Tropicana
You’re crying in Miami, and I’m living it up in Havana
She misses Mi Habana Tu and the Bucanero she drank
You’re crying in Miami, and I’m living it up in Havana
For how long? When will it end?
if you act like a Yuma, you have to leave
For how long? When will it end?
if you act like a Yuma, you have to go
go, go, go
if you act like a Yuma, you have to go
go, go, go
if you act like a Yuma, you have to go
She speaks to me in English and I don’t understand
if you act like a Yuma, you have to go
Ready, let’s live it up!
Everybody raise their hands
let’s sing it!
Tell me, how you’ve been, if you have found happiness
Tell me how are you doing? I’m doing fine
How you doing over there?
Tell me, how you’ve been, if you have found happiness
Tell me how are you doing? I’m doing fine
How you doing over there?
(El Chacal ) hey baby, I keep doing what I’m doing and I won’t give it up
that’s why I am who I am, and I do what I like, what I fucking want!
From the barracks pavel, frank dos metra , respect me,
do it so you can learn,
this is for you to enjoy not for you to criticize
ok, ok, what do you want bread for, if I have coffee cake
Did you get it?
By ALEJANDRO ARMENGOL 2009
A CubaNews translation.
Edited by Walter Lippmann.
Anywhere in the world we can determine how good a functionary is. In Cuba, however, the unknown quantity is for how long.
It doesn’t matter that a doctor spends his time overseeing the economy or that a general is put in charge of the cultivation of sugar cane. Efficiency is not the main concern.
If anything has functioned well on the island over the past year it is international relations, and it is precisely in this arena that the most striking changes have been made.
One might argue that such successes are not solely due to the foreign minister, but it is also worth noting that they would not have been achieved without his input. At the least, one ought to concede that he was a good messenger.
Except that in Havana it is easier to replace the messenger than the source of the tidings. That’s why you can have a minister who is brilliant today and “unworthy” tomorrow.
Ministerial changes take place everywhere, as do political intrigues. Power is equally corrupting in capitalism and socialism. But in thinking about the changes that have transpired during the past week, there is something else, over and above all the explanations, that seems almost ghoulish: the recurrence of a seemingly never-ending mechanism that transforms someone from saintliness to dishonor, from representing the country’s best to sinking into its worst, dropping them from heaven to hell.
It is like turning the Bible into a simple gangster saga. It reduces a political process into the turf battles of a mafia family. It is like governing a country the way you might run a store, where the owner suddenly tells the customers that he had to fire the butcher because after ten years he just discovered that the butcher wasn’t washing his hands when he went to the bathroom.
Seen from the perspective of a week, the Cuban events lead one to think that one of the objectives has been to produce uncertainly, or its big brother: fear, even terror. With the publication of Fidel Castro’s “reflection,” what began on Monday as a broad restructuring of the government turned into a hint of something more sinister: a preventative blow against a possible conspiracy, with the government getting rid of figures in whom the “external enemy” might have hopes.
The changes of last Monday were first seen as a step taken by Raúl Castro to consolidate his power and move forward in establishing his own more institutional style of government, without using groups and individuals who – outside the bounds of governmental structures – wielded a considerable measure of power because they answered directly to Fidel Castro. Above all it was another response to the worry that “the revolution could be destroyed by its own members.” If Fidel Castro thought the solution lay in a generational change, Raúl sees it in sticking with the “historics.”
So there was an initial explanation, both for the fall of Carlos Lage “the reformer” and Felipe Pérez Roque “from the new generation.” It doesn’t matter that neither of them fully fit those roles, because a lot depends on perception, and especially on how they were seen abroad.
Then Fidel Castro’s “reflection” changed this initial perception, and their removal was explained by the conduct of both individuals. The (ex?) Commander-in-Chief leveled strong accusations, and came close to calling them traitors. His characterization of them as “unworthy” is reminiscent of previous trials: once again a potential threat is being thwarted.
By resigning all their posts, Lage and Pérez Roque carry out their final acts of loyalty to Fidel Castro. In two letters, whose only difference was the paper they were written on, both carry out their final assignment in support of the Comandante.
In a different period things would have gone worse for them: suicide or the firing squad. Now it seems that a piece of paper is enough. It is another illustration that the saga has drawn to a close. Cuba has returned to the epoch of generals and bureaucrats. Both the “reflection” and the letters seem aimed at making the process of restructuring into some form of a purge.
Therefore analysts and experts should resist the temptation to think that they already have the perfect explanation. Fidel Castro’s demand seems clear. In this drama he cannot appear to be the loser. Not because he was not ready to cede, which he has done, nor to deny that in the final analysis the whole movement is decided between both brothers. Here appearances are what is important, along with the image presented to the outside world, which is what he is most interested in.
And now the replacement of Fernando Remírez de Estenoz as head of the International Relations Department of the Communist Party (PCC) creates new speculation. The news has not been officially confirmed by Havana. But it leads us to wonder whether the departure of this official is related to the wave of firings. He had been vice-minister of foreign relations and headed Cuba’s diplomatic mission in Washington in the days when Havana was fighting for the return of young Elián González, and is a figure very closely linked to Lage.
It is hard to imagine that Remírez de Estenoz will go on to hold a higher position than the one he had, because on various occasions in the past his name had been raised as the possible foreign minister, a post to which Bruno Rodríguez Parrilla has just been named.
If he is kept removed from diplomatic functions –which seems to be the present situatio – Cuba is ruling out one of the most competent figures for potential negotiations with the United States, and it reaffirms the conclusion that Fidel and Raúl Castro feel they do not need “intermediaries” in this matter. In any case, they have just shown that there is no safety at their side, except in terms of the distance you keep, something that friends as well as enemies might bear in mind.
By Iroel Sánchez
A CubaNews translation.
Edited by Walter Lippmann.
March 21, 2017
Some time ago I published some questions about Havana:
“Is it a coincidence that places like Parque Lenin or Coppelia [ice-cream parlor in Vedado], symbols of the democratization of recreation and the access of the majority to refinement –opened by the collective project of the Revolution– languish between bad service and structural deterioration, while the idea that the good and the beautiful are the exclusive patrimony of the pre-revolutionary past? Why is the Latin American Stadium increasingly called the “Estadium del Cerro” in our media?
“Is it a Havana for tourists the one that will reach its 500th anniversary, reproducing the celebrations with the colonial flavor that –unlike what happened with the half millennium of Santiago de Cuba– took place in many of the towns founded by the Spaniards? Or as in Santiago, the neighborhoods built by the Revolution –and now more or less vandalized– (Camilo Cienfuegos, San Agustín, Alamar, Mulgoba, Reparto Electrico …) can renew their (lack of) urbanism and raise the quality of life of hundreds of thousands of Havana workers who have never been able to sit in a “paladar” [private restaurant]?
“Will the newly refurbished Capitolio of Havana be an old building for a new democracy, or a shell that –between marbles and bronzes, so dear to the dictatorships and plutocracies– forgets to consecrate the name of Jesus Menendez, the black working-class parliamentarian who imposed on the Yankees and the Cuban bourgeoisie a fair deal for the sugar workers. As a result, he was murdered despite his parliamentary immunity in “the most democratic period in contemporary Cuban history,” a phrase taken from an article in the Spanish newspaper El País signed by a Cuban “historian”?
And I return to these questions because, fortunately, for a few months now in the capital of the country we can see the growth of a transformative effort in favor of the majorities: renewing public spaces –like those mentioned in my questions– accessible to those who lack the resources to visit the new recreation centers which have prospered under the new economic measures. Large agricultural markets have been opened on the outskirts of the city. State-run gastronomic facilities with popular prices have been rescued. Fountains that had been without water for decades are running again. And other achievements are beginning to take shape with the decentralized funds collected by the municipalities. It can be said that, through these actions, the city thrives, because most of its inhabitants prosper.
But if that effort is not accompanied by the participation of the people in creating a culture of civic order and urbanity, all this effort will be like pedaling on a stationary bicycle. This participation must stem from a popular debate –we have the organizations and media to do so– that would serve for the dissemination and production of consensus around the rules that regulate and punish –if they were enforced– the frequent aggressions against common property.
To give just one example: the debris generated by construction work –for repairing opulent mansions acquired by landlords and the new rich in the most central municipalities of Havana– will continue to be dumped with impunity on street corners, so that the state sector –that is: the lowest paid workers– pay for its free collection without taking into account that, as explained by the British academic Emily Morris:
“As the non-state sector has developed, it has become increasingly clear that the relatively inefficient private firms have been able to thrive within the national economy since their costs in Cuban pesos, including labor, are undervalued at the CADECA / CUC rate they use for their transactions. In fact, the Cuban state is subsidizing the new non-state sector through the underrated rate of CADECA. Meanwhile, state-owned enterprises have to use the overvalued official exchange rate, a serious disadvantage in terms of their competitiveness. A form of “monetary illusion” which means that efficient state-owned enterprises report losses and therefore cannot raise capital for investment; while private entrepreneurs operating at very low productivity levels enjoy strong hidden state subsidies but complain of excessively high taxes.”
The non-state economy has much to contribute in Cuba; but illegality, tax evasion, hoarding, appropriation of the common good, and speculation with deficit products are not the best allies to convince of its virtues.
The first thing that should be clarified is what we mean when we use the verb “to prosper”.
In those economically “most prosperous” territories (such as: Trinidad –where business has developed along with the growth of garbage in the streets, and the notorious tax evasion reached such extremes that the ONAT [National Office for Tax Collection] of Sancti Spiritus had to be moved over there; Viñales –where teachers have to be taken from other municipalities and private pools try to steal the scarce water supply in times of drought; or Havana, where part of the efforts to supply popular restaurants and cafeterias, education and health centers, drains to private restaurants or bars that remain open until five in the morning –not until 3:00 am as it is regulated) businesses are favored by the indirect subsidies of the CADECA 25 to 1 exchange rate, the low rates of water, gas and electricity conceived for domestic use, but used for profit; the free disposal of increased amounts of solid waste –as if this waste came from the kitchen of a home.
In this way development and prosperity will be patrimony of a few to the detriment of the majority.(CubAhora)
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